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ABSTRACT 
   
In this dissertation, I argue that the original development of Natural Law Theory 
(NLT) by the Stoics of the second and first centuries B.C. was not merely an outpouring 
or natural byproduct of an earlier philosophic achievement in Plato and Aristotle, but a 
reaction to it, specifically, an effort to correct certain problems that had surfaced as a 
result of discussion within and challenges to the broader eudaimonistic tradition. Prior to 
Cicero's writings in particular, the term "natural law" appears only occasionally in the 
philosophic texts, and never as a term signifying a coherent and developed moral theory. 
A central part of my argument will be to demonstrate the negative thesis that neither 
Plato nor Aristotle defended a version of NLT - a claim that current scholarship does not 
universally accept. The primary reason for my claim, I argue, is that neither Plato nor 
Aristotle accepted a conception of nature (physis) that contained a normative element that 
could be understood in terms of law (nomos) and its accompanying notions of command 
and obligation. This negative thesis is important because it clarifies the central 
modification the Stoics make on the eudaimonistic tradition, namely, the advancement of 
a distinct theory of nature, one in which they identify physis with "Divine Reason."  The 
"theological conception" of physis, as I shall call it, entails a breakdown of the nomos-
physis dichotomy that had been central to Greek thought for centuries prior and thereby 
makes possible the birth of NLT. 
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1.1 Metaphysics and Natural Law: The Contemporary Debate 
 The thesis of this dissertation rests on the key assumption that a close analysis of 
the original formation of Natural Law Theory (hereafter NLT) is relevant to current 
debates in natural law scholarship, especially the debate concerning the role of 
metaphysical claims in NLT.  The primary purpose of the present chapter is to account 
for this assumption, beginning with the following observation: the attention given to the 
historical development of NLT by contemporary scholars and theorists has focused to a 
large extent on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, presumably with the assumption that 
a correct interpretation of Aquinas' NLT entails a correct understanding of NLT itself, or 
at least its most important commitments.  I do not reject this assumption, but I believe 
that the approach is unsatisfactory because it is incomplete.  More specifically, what this 
approach overlooks is the possibility that Aquinas was heavily indebted to a natural law 
tradition that had already seen over twelve-hundred years of development.  Furthermore, 
this development occurred in the context of Stoic natural law, and insofar as we are right 
to think of NLT as a single tradition, it was (and is) a tradition in which the basic terms 
and assumptions were supplied, at least in part, by Stoic theorists.  Hence we find in 
Aquinas' account of NLT, for example, a sizeable imprint of Stoic terminology, e.g. 
Divine Reason, Supreme Governor, and Divine providence.
1
   
                                                 
1
 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), I.2.91-93. 
  2 
 But the value of an account of Stoic NLT is not limited to studies of Thomas' 
moral theory.  Much of the increased interest in Aquinas' NLT among contemporary 
scholars and theorists has focused on the key debate regarding whether or not the basic 
principles of NLT are themselves metaphysical principles or derive from metaphysical 
principles.  The debate began in earnest following Germain Grisez's 1965 essay on St. 
Thomas' first principle of practical reason.
2
  According to Grisez, Aquinas' first principle 
of practical reason (as well as the first precept of natural law), namely, that "Good is to be 
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided," is not a command or imperative such as 
expressed in the formula, "Do good and avoid evil."  Rather, it should be understood as a 
descriptive claim that Aquinas believed was presupposed in all morally evaluable action.  
On this view, the ability of practical reason to grasp basic human goods and to direct the 
human agent toward realizing or achieving them provides the necessary condition for 
human action rather than an imperative or a command that results in moral success or 
failure.  If correct, Grisez's account requires a significant revision of the traditional Neo-
scholastic account of St. Thomas' theory.  The effort to provide such a revised 
understanding constitutes a large part of what is known now as the New Natural Law 
(NNL) theory.  One consequently finds that NNL in its origin and continuation has rested 
and continues to rest on a new understanding of Aquinas' conception of natural law and 
on a conviction that received interpretations of St. Thomas' theory were incorrect. 
 The central claim of NNL is that a worked out system of natural law and practical 
reason need not (because, on this view, it logically cannot) depend upon certain 
inferences from a prior philosophy of nature.  As we find in John Finnis' Natural Law 
                                                 
2
 Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2" in Natural Law Forum, Vol. 10 (Notre Dame: Notre Dame School of Law, 1965). 
  3 
and Natural Rights, the NNL theorist is Humean – or Humean enough – in his insistence 
upon the unbridgeable gap between fact claims and value claims, between “is” and 
“ought.”  Hume wrote, 
 In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always 
 remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
 reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning 
 human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual 
 copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not 
 connected with an ought, or an ought not.  This change is imperceptible; but is, 
 however, of the last consequence.  For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
 new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be  observed and 
 explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
 altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can  be a deduction from others, 




Regarding the Humean thesis, Finnis states that "the principle is both true and 
significant."
4
  We find the principle implied in Robert George's summary of NNL in his 
essay, “Natural Law and Positive Law.”  According to George, NNL consists of three 
core principles: 
[F]irst, and most fundamentally, a set of principles directing human choice and 
action toward intelligible purposes, i.e., basic human goods which, as intrinsic 
aspects of human well-being and fulfillment, constitute reasons for action whose 
intelligibility as reasons does not depend on any more fundamental reasons (or on 
sub-rational motives such as the desire for emotional satisfactions) to which they 
are mere means; second, a set of ‘intermediate’ moral principles which specify the 
most basic principle of morality by directing choice and action toward 
possibilities that may be chosen consistently with a will toward integral human 
fulfillment and away from possibilities the choosing of which is inconsistent with 
such a will; and third, fully specific moral norms which require or forbid 
(sometimes without exceptions) certain specific possible choices.
5
 
   
                                                 
3
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), III.1.1. 
4
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 39-42. 
5
 Robert P. George, “Natural Law and Positive Law” in In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 102. 
  4 
The key point to notice is that nowhere in these three principles – beginning with the 
most general and abstract enumeration of non-inferred basic goods, e.g. friendship, and 
ending with the most concrete specifications of the natural law, e.g. “Do not commit 
adultery” – do we find a preexisting cosmological outlook, a natural setting as it were.  
What we have instead is an independent and organic system of practical reasonableness 
constituted by an intuited (or non-inferred) apprehension of certain basic goods.
6
  That is, 
NNL  represents a theory in which moral knowledge of certain goods as truly good - that 
is, they are bona fide human goods - is possible apart from any inference from some prior 
metaphysical or anthropological truth.
7
  As J. Budziszewski summarizes, they are things 
"we can’t not know."8    
 However, George writes elsewhere that NNL theory also contends that “basic 
human goods and moral norms are what they are because human nature is what it is,” and 
thus, contrary to the objections of Russell Hittenger and Lloyd Weinreb, NNL is not 
"natural law without nature."
9
  Grisez and his followers, George argues, rely on a 
fundamental distinction between grounding the natural law in nature and inferring the 
natural law from nature, and that one's acceptance of the former claim does not entail 
acceptance of the latter claim.
 
 George summarizes the point as follows: "the real issue is 
                                                 
6
 By independent, I mean a moral theory, more specifically a moral epistemology, that is not derived from 
other non-moral (metaphysical) principles.   
7
 This claim suggests the possibility of enumerating the basic goods based on empirical evidence.  NNL 
theorists have, consequently, made efforts along these lines.  However, there continues to be substantial 
debate over what these goods actually are.  Lists have been given.  Some have been trimmed, others 
extended, leading to the unavoidable point that our intuiting certain things to be good is something quite 
different from our clearly and consciously apprehending their goodness, such that even to enumerate the 
goods things can be (as it has been) quite difficult. 
8
 See J. Budziszewski, What We Can’t Not Know (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003). 
9
 George, "Natural Law and Human Nature" in In Defense of Natural Law, 85.  The phrase, "natural law 
without nature," is a chapter title in Weinreb's book, Natural Law and Justice (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1990).   
  5 
whether their claim that the most basic practical principles and moral norms are not 
inferred from prior knowledge of human nature somehow entails the proposition that 
morality is not grounded in nature."
10
  The NNL theorist therefore makes two distinct 
claims: (1) negatively, the most basic normative principles of NLT are known non-
inferrentially, that is, they are not derived or inferred from still more basic metaphysical 
principles; (2) positively, the most basic normative principles of the natural law are 
grounded in human nature.   I will attempt to clarify these two claims in order, and then I 
will give attention to an additional key claim of NNL: (3) the basic principles of NLT are 
not imperatives or commands, but the necessary preconditions for practical argument and 
action.   
 Central to Grisez's interpretation of Aquinas on the first principle of practical 
reason, found in Summa theologiae, 1-2, question 94,  is his treatment of the notion of 
self-evidence.  For Aquinas, self-evidence has two senses: something may be self-evident 
in itself (though individual people may or may not recognize it), which Grisez calls 
"objectively self-evident"; or something may be self-evident to us ("subjectively self-
evident"), and thus Aquinas describes it as knowledge that "falls within the grasp of 
everyone."
11
  Aquinas introduces this distinction, Grisez argues, in order to state that the 
"basic principles of natural law on the whole...are self-evident to all men."
12
  There are 
certainly principles of the natural law that are not known by all men - e.g. God should be 
loved above all, and God should be obeyed before all - even though these principles are 
"objectively self-evident."  "However, the basic principles of natural law on the 
                                                 
10
 George, 85. 
11
 Grisez, 172-175. 
12
 Ibid, 172. 
  6 
whole...are self-evident to all men" - self-evident in the objective sense in that they are 
principles that cannot be derived from some prior principle(s), and self-evident in the 
subjective sense in that all people recognize their underivability and their status as the 
first principles of practical reasoning.  
 Grisez roots his analysis in Aquinas' treatment of the "intelligibility" of the 
subject of a self-evident principle.  By "intelligibility," Grisez takes Aquinas to mean "all 
that would be included in the meaning of a word that is used correctly if the things 
referred to in that use were fully known in all ways relevant to the aspect then signified 
by the word in question."
13
  I cannot deal with all of what Grisez states here, but the basic 
point seems to be this:  a universally recognized principle of natural law is self-evident 
because the predicate of that principle belongs to the intelligibility of the subject of that 
same principle.  In other words, the basic principles of natural law are statements in 
which the predicate states something about the subject that is part of the meaning of the 
subject, and hence  the truth of the statement is immediately grasped apart from 
additional arguments.  This appears to be Grisez's point when he states that "the 
subjective aspect of self-evidence, recognition of underivability, requires that one have 
such an adequate understanding of what is signified by the principle that no mistaken 
effort will be made to provide a derivation for it."
14
  Based on this understanding of 
intelligibility, Grisez concludes  that the basic principles of NLT, according to Aquinas, 
are not "tautologies derived by mere conceptual analysis," but rather genuine 
foundational principles of practical reason that people recognize as both intelligible and 
underiviable.   
                                                 
13
 Ibid, 174. 
14
 Grisez, 173. 
  7 
 The foregoing analysis clarifies George's point that the basic principles of natural 
law, while not inferred from nature, are nevertheless grounded in nature - the second of 
the aforementioned central claims.  George's argument, directed primarily at Lloyd 
Weinreb's criticism that the New Natural Law is "deontological natural law" and hence 
detached from human nature, is as follows: 
 [O]nly that which is understood to be worthwhile can provide a reason for action.  
 Only that which is humanly fulfilling can be understood as worthwhile.  Intrinsic 
 goods are basic reasons for action precisely because they are (intrinsic) aspects of 
 human well-being and fulfillment.  They perfect human beings, i.e., beings with a 
 human nature.  As human perfections, 'basic goods' belong to human beings as 




Because human beings readily and universally recognize the intelligibility of the basic 
principles of the natural law (which is to say that human beings naturally and non-
inferrentially recognize the worthiness or desirability of the basic goods which supply the 
content of the basic principles), and because these basic goods truly are intrinsic aspects 
of the "well-being and fulfillment of flesh and blood human beings," it follows that the 
basic principles must be human principles, which is to say, they refer to constituent 
aspects of human nature.
16
  In other words, we would not grasp the basic principles of 
human good if we were something other than what we are.  D.J. O'Connor's aptly 




 One might object to the foregoing position of NNL by stating that it is unclear 
how one could be practically reasonable, which is to say, that one's practical judgments 
are good ones, without first considering how one's practical judgments "fit" or "accord" 
                                                 
15
 George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," 86. 
16
 George, "Natural Law and Positive Law," 103. 
17
 D.J. O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London: Macmillan Press, 1967), 18. 
  8 
what is naturally good for human beings.  O'Connor observes, for example, that "any 
form of a natural law theory of morals entails the belief that propositions about man's 
duties and obligations can be inferred from propositions about his nature."
18
  In response 
to this claim, John Finnis argues that 
 it is simply not true...nor is it true that for Aquinas 'good and evil concepts are 
 analyzed and fixed in metaphysics before they are applied in morals'...Aquinas 
 asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of natural law...are per se 
 nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable.  They are not inferred from speculative 
 principles.  They are not inferred from facts.  They are not inferred from 
 metaphysical propositions about human nature, or about the nature of good and 
 evil, or about 'the function of a human being,' nor are they inferred from a 
 teleological conception of nature or any other conception of nature.  They  are not 
 inferred or derived from anything."
19
   
 
Finnis' terse treatment of O'Connor's position, however, seems to overlook a key point 
the latter is making: O'Connor's assertion is not exclusively about the first principles of 
the natural law, but about "propositions about man's duties and obligations," which is to 
say, about practical argumentation in general.  It is not clear that O'Connor intends to 
suggest that any moral agent must first settle the fundamental metaphysical questions of 
life before he can make any practical judgments about how he ought to live.  His 
argument, in other words, is not that soundness in practical reasoning depends entirely 
upon a prior soundness in theoretical reasoning, but rather that practical judgments can be 
inferred from metaphysical or anthropological principles - a weaker claim, though an 
important one insofar as it implies a rejection of the Humean thesis noted earlier.     
 Thus, O'Connor's foregoing position, and Finnis' rejection of it, further clarifies 
the position of NNL theory (insofar as it is represented by Finnis): any practical argument 
that contains a descriptive premise would, on that basis alone, be an invalid argument.  
                                                 
18
 Ibid, 33. 
19
 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 33-34. 
  9 
According to the Finnis-Grisez interpretation of Aquinas, the reason why the first 
principles of practical reason (which are also the first principles of natural law) do not 
violate the fact/norm principle is that the principles "make no reference at all to human 
nature, but only to human good."
20
  Hence, right (practical) reason does not amount to, or 
is not derived from, a theoretical understanding of human nature; rather, it is reasoning 
that is oriented or conducive to the human good.  Finnis complicates his position, 
however, by granting that the observations of the "descriptive theorist" (which term he 
uses synonymously with the "social scientist") are still useful for the purposes of practical 
reasoning because the facts he reports, assuming they truly are facts about human beings, 
are value-laden, not value-free.
21
 Such facts are value-laden because the descriptive 
theorist's observations are made with a view to what people regard as important:  
 [T]he disciplined acquisition of accurate knowledge about human affairs - and 
 thus about what other men have considered practically important, and about the 
 actual results of their concern - is an important help to the reflective and critical 
 theorist in his effort to convert his own (and his culture's) practical 'prejudices' 
 into truly reasonable judgments about what is good and practically 
 reasonable...But the knowledge [of the descriptive theorist] will not have been 
 attained without a preliminary conceptualization and thus a  preliminary set of 
 principles of selection and relevance drawn from some practical viewpoint. "
22
   
 
Without further argument, Finnis concludes that there is "a movement to and fro between, 
on the one hand, assessments of human good and its practical requirements, and on the 
other hand, explanatory descriptions," and that in this movement "there is no question of 
deriving one's basic judgments about human values and the requirements of practical 
reasonableness by some inference from the facts of the human situation."
23
  The 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, 36. 
21





  10 
argument is unconvincing, I think, apart from some additional account of how the moral 
agent can make use of descriptive accounts of human nature in his practical judgments 
about what is good without violating the fact/norm principle at the same time.   
 In addition to the foregoing central claims of NNL theory we should add a third: 
the basic principles of the natural law are not commands or obligations but the necessary 
conditions for practical argument and action.  In support of this claim, Grisez argues that 
St. Thomas intended a distinction between the first precept of the natural law, "Good 
should be done and pursued, and evil avoided," and the command, "Do good and avoid 
evil."
24
  He objects to the received interpretation that regards the first principle of 
practical reason to be the command, "Do good and avoid evil," which, as an inscription 
written by God, man discovers in his conscience.  Human beings then understand good as 
what accords with human nature, and evil as what opposes human nature; as a 
consequence, human beings seek to determine which actions are good and ought to be 
done and which are evil and ought to be avoided on that basis.  Practical reason, then, 
works deductively from general claims about what is fitting for human nature to more 
concrete principles of action (e.g. stealing is bad) to still more concrete applications.
25
   
 According to Grisez, the key mistake of this interpretation is that it overlooks the 
fact that in one formula, namely "Do good, and avoid evil," the notion of pursuit is 
omitted whereas the other incorporates it.  The reason for this error is the apparent 
assumption that in the first precept Aquinas means by "good" the same as "morally 
good."  But this assumption apparently neglects the idea of "final causes," an idea 
                                                 
24
 Grisez, 168. 
25
 This summary of the received interpretation of St. Thomas is taken from Grisez, 168.  Grisez footnotes 
that this interpretation can be seen in the work of Thomas J. Higgins, Man as Man: The Science and Art of 
Ethics (Charlotte, NC: Tan Books and Publishers, 1992). 
  11 
underlying St. Thomas' entire NLT.  The place of reason in Thomas' initial definition of 
law makes clear that his thinking about law is "intellectualistic," not "voluntaristic," and 
thus the notion of "end" and its intelligibility is foundational for his entire theory of 
practical reason and law.
26
  Says Grisez, "What is noteworthy here is Aquinas' 
assumption that the first principle of practical reason is the last end."
27
  The intelligibility 
of the final end implies that suitable or correct action does not adhere "to a static nature," 
but rather "to the ends to which nature inclines."
28
  The end to which human nature tends 
is not, Thomas argues, correct moral action because moral action is a means to the final 
end and thus not the end itself.
29
  The end, rather, is the manifestly metaphysical notion 
of participation in the goodness of God which is the ultimate good, one that transcends 
the goodness of morally laudable actions.  On this point, Grisez asserts a parting of ways 
between St. Thomas and Aristotle, for the latter argued that virtuous activity is the final 
end whereas Aquinas "sees the end of man as the attainment of a good."
30
  Thus, 
appropriate or good action is the means necessary for achieving the goods or ends that 
practical reason grasps naturally and universally as being good and worth pursuing.  
These ends or goods, then, are not things that ought or ought not to be done as though 
they were imperatives of some sort.  Rather, because we seek them naturally and 
unavoidably, they provide the necessary condition for all practical thinking and action, 
whether good or bad.   
                                                 
26
 Ibid, 181. 
27




 As I will note, if this interpretation is correct, then Aquinas would be out of step with Aristotle on a 
critical matter of moral theory, namely the intrinsic goodness of moral (virtuous) activity.  While this point 
does not in itself undermine Grisez's interpretation of Aquinas, it does raise questions about its plausibility. 
30
 Ibid, 183. 
  12 
 Among the numerous criticisms of NNL, the "Hittinger-McInerny critique,"
31
 we 
may call it, is the most acute and comprehensive.  The basic contention of Russell 
Hittinger and Ralph McInerny is that NNL theory is based on the historically inaccurate 
claim that natural law theorists, St. Thomas most of all, have held to a view of practical 
reason that dispenses with any methodological need for a knowledge of nature.  
McInerny in his Ethica Thomistica charges the New Natural Law, Grisez and Finnis most 
of all, with incorporating a thoroughly Humean understanding of practical rationality 
"which regards knowledge of the world to be irrelevant to [practical reason]."
32
  And as 
George correctly remarks, "Obviously, any theory of practical philosophical reasoning 
that merits identification with the practical philosophy of David Hume cannot plausibly 
be counted as a natural law theory."
33
  Hittenger has perhaps been most pointed in 
assertion that the New Natural Law holds to what is essentially a Kantian understanding 
of practical reason.  By arguing that ethics can be methodologically independent of 
metaphysics because the starting point of practical reflection is not nature but the non-
inferential apprehensions of practical reason itself, the NNL theorist is in effect adopting 
deontological ethics and inherits all of its many problems, not least the problem that such 
a moral theory is not genuinely a human moral theory.   
 It is not necessary for my purpose to provide a detailed account of the Hittenger-
McInerny critique here because their position, although compelling in some ways, does 
not give attention to developments in NLT that precede the work of Aquinas and the 
                                                 
31
 This critique is largely based on Russell Hittinger's A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987) and Ralph McInerny's Ethica Thomistica (Washington, 
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982).  George deals extensively with this critique in his 
essays "Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory" and Natural Law and Human nature" in In Defense of 
Natural Law. 
32
 George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," 85. 
33
 Ibid, 84. 
  13 
medieval natural law tradition more broadly.  Indeed, this omission is generally 
characteristic of current scholarship that has, for some reason or another, overlooked the 
importance of tracing the tradition of NLT back to its origins in ancient pagan 
philosophy, specifically Stoic philosophy.  In Russell Hittenger's The First Grace, for 
example, he roots his "rediscovery of the natural law" in an essentially medieval 
Christian achievement that "emerged as part of the repertoire of moral and legal thought 
once the Greek logos-metaphysics was appropriated by the biblical theology of a creating 
and lawgiving God."
34
  Hittenger dismisses the possibility of an earlier development of 
natural law, simply stating that prior to its Christian formulation beginning with St. 
Augustine the phrase "natural law," combining the Greek terms of physis and nomos, did 
not mean anything "more than a comical union of opposites, or a merely metaphorical 
extension of concepts that properly reside elsewhere."
35
  Howard P. Kainz's book, 
Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-Examination, correctly acknowledges the Stoics as 
having provided the earliest articulation of NLT, but his treatment of ancient moral 
theory and Stoic natural law in particular is anemic.  He generally disregards, for 
instance, the key philosophical developments that occur during the Hellenistic period, 
ones in which basic assumptions held by Plato and Aristotle were either modified or 
rejected altogether.  Despite the fact that the Stoics advanced a fundamentally distinct 
conception of nature than that of Plato and Aristotle, as this dissertation will discuss, 
Kainz asserts with little argument that NLT is "foreshadowed" in Plato and Aristotle.   
Toward the end of Natural Law and Natural Right, Finnis gives some important and 
                                                 
34
 Russel Hittenger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World 
(Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), xix. 
35
 Ibid. 
  14 
careful attention to Stoic natural law, particularly to the shifting role and meaning of 
natura, and correctly understands the core Stoic teaching of "following nature" 
(homologia) to rely upon deductive inferences from a definite philosophy of nature.  
However, Finnis also asserts that the reliance of Stoic natural law upon a theoretical 
understanding of nature is one of the reasons for current and widespread 
misunderstandings of Aquinas (based on the faulty supposition that Aquinas was heir to 
the Stoic approach).
36
  In doing so, he makes two obvious assumptions: first, that an 
accurate representation of NLT must be in some sense an accurate representation of 
Thomas' NLT; and, second, that Thomas' NLT is incompatible with that of the Stoics.  I 
am not interested in challenging the first assumption.  In response to the second 
assumption, Finnis may be right in his assessment, but to make that argument he needs to 
provide a more thorough analysis of Stoic NLT, particularly of certain essential concepts 
that Thomas also relies upon in his own theory, e.g. providence and Divine Reason.  As it 
stands, Finnis' argument is unconvincing. 
 It appears, then, that the effort to provide a sustained consideration of the 
formative period of natural law in ancient Greek and Hellenistic thought, a period that 
would subsequently provide the basis for the tradition within which Aquinas would later 
operate and to which he owes a substantial debt, is a generally unorthodox and unusual 
project in contemporary natural law scholarship.  Yet as Lloyd Weinreb noted in a lecture 
to the Fordham Natural Law Colloquium: "Thomistic philosophy did not arise in the 
thirteenth century out of thin air.  If it was a new beginning, nevertheless it emerged out 
of a long tradition that had developed over more than 1,500 years and continued to 
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develop after the fourteenth century in other directions.  If Thomism represents the high 
point and the greatest flourishing of natural law, that larger tradition also has to be 
considered."
37
  This dissertation is an attempt at such a consideration. 
 
1.2  Nature and Normativity in Weinreb's Critique of NNL 
 Weinreb's work, especially in the book, Natural Law and Justice, is of particular 
importance to the present project because he, too, argues that NNL theory departs from 
the older conception, and he also roots his thesis in a particular account of the formation 
of natural law theory in the ancient world.
 
 Weinreb's primary thesis is that Grisez and 
subsequent NNL theorists mistakenly present the core natural law tradition as a 
"deontological" moral theory rather than as an "ontological" one.  One of the main 
priorities of deontological ethicists, of course, is to articulate a fully rational normative 
system of principles and imperatives detached from questions of nature.  According to 
Weinreb, however, the attempt of Grisez and his followers to salvage NLT without a 
theory of nature overlooks the critical problem that natural law in its original and 
traditional conception sought to address: the problem of how "man is a part of nature and 
yet apart from it."  How can a human being be a part of the natural order of efficient 
causes and yet be a free moral agent, able to make his own decisions and be responsible 
for them?  Weinreb summarizes the problem as follows: 
 Unless a person's act is free, that is, self-determined, he is not morally responsible 
 for it.  But unless the circumstances of his act and the personal qualities that make 
 him act as he does are determinate, the act seems to be the product of arbitrary 
 occurrences as far as he is concerned and not something for which he individually 
 is responsible.  Yet if the circumstances and his personal qualities are determinate 
 and determine his act, then once again the act is not self-determined and he is not 
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 morally responsible.  In order for a person to act freely in the relevant moral 




Only within the context of a causally determined natural order can one's actions be non-
arbitrary and morally significant; but that very causally determined order prevents one's 
actions from being truly free and thus prevents one from being responsible for those 
actions.  As Weinreb summarizes, "Full moral responsibility seems to require that an act 
be both free and determinate."
39
 
 The notion that "nature is normative" summarizes, Weinreb argues, the effort of 
traditional NLT to address this basic problem.  Belief in a normative natural order, 
however, was not coeval with the birth of natural law in Stoic thought, but was rooted in 
earlier Greek thought in its various poetic, dramatic, and philosophic manifestations: 
"From the first, the idea of a normative order immanent in nature was a fundamental 
element of classical Greek speculation...[F]rom Homer until the transmission of Greek 
culture to Rome, the belief that the course of events fulfilled an inherent normative order 
affected Greek thought profoundly and pervasively."
40
  The presupposition that physis 
comprises a normative dimension carries with it the key implication that the term was not 
originally considered antithetical to nomos, but only became so with the emergence of 
sophism in the fifth century.  Only then, Weinreb claims, do we find introduced among 
Greek intellectuals the widespread confusion regarding the relation of law and nature, 
yielding varying responses that became strands in a rather complicated tapestry of 
philosophic discourse.  There was Protagoras' celebration of nomos as the grand human 
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achievement as well as Callicles' condemnation of nomos as a form of unnatural bondage 
upon great men, and various views in between.  It would be Plato's and Aristotle's great 
achievement (despite important disagreements between them), in response to the attacks 
of the sophists and conventionalists who rejected the objective reality of moral standards 
by way of the nomos-physis antithesis, to restore the position that "law and morality are 
not changeable human dictates but are aspects of reality itself."
41
  For Plato and Aristotle, 
physis contained an explicitly normative dimension that serves as the basis for moral and 
legal theory; thus, although not properly natural law theorists themselves, "the 




 Thus, according to Weinreb's analysis, the original NLT developed by the Stoics 
and presented by Cicero in the first century B.C.  "does not compose a separate doctrine" 
but is rather a synthesis of earlier beliefs and attitudes regarding the human condition as 
being both determined and self-determining.
43
  As Weinreb understands Stoic natural law 
and the subsequent tradition that developed from it, its primary assertion is that what is is 
what ought to be; thus, the freedom/determinism problem is averted by the claim that the 
natural order of determinate efficient causes is itself normatively ordered.
44
  It follows 
from this claim that normativity and moral responsibility extends over not only all 
morally significant acts - that is, acts that are "self-determined" - but over all facts 
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regarding a person, what he is and all the circumstances of his life.
45
  This seems to 
require the belief that all the facts of one's life and circumstances, including whatever 
misfortunes one might encounter, e.g. deadly illnesses, are not merely how things are but 
how they ought to be or must be, which is to say, they are deserved - a claim that 
Weinreb finds to be "not only incomprehensible but morally outrageous."
46
  NNL theory 
apparently avoids making such claims by basing normative claims on the intuited 
coherence of certain goods rather than on facts about the natural order.  However, 
Weinreb insists that NNL theory, by doing so, merely avoids the central question of 
moral philosophy concerning freedom and moral responsibility and focuses instead on 
questions of obligation: "Everything seems to depend on the narrow question: Is law 
necessarily obligatory or not?"
47
    
 Weinreb correctly asserts that traditional NLT depends upon a particular 
understanding of nature as normative or normatively ordered, and that such an 
understanding of nature is foundational to how one must understand natural law and 
practical reason - an interpretation that was largely uncontroverted prior to the work of 
Grisez and Finnis.
48
  He is also correct in seeking to establish an historical context for 
understanding traditional NLT, one rooted in some fashion in ancient Greek thought.  
However, the question of freedom and determinism, while a central concern in modern 
moral theory and certainly not irrelevant to older debates, I find secondary to the more 
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fundamental question of the proper relation of nomos and physis in Platonic and 
Aristotelian moral theory and the subsequent birth of natural law.  In the next two 
chapters, I challenge Weinreb's assertion that Plato's and Aristotle's understanding of 
physis contained an explicitly normative dimension, that "It was real, and it was 
normative."
49
  I argue that at the center of their moral theories, despite important 
differences, is the claim that the philosopher contemplates the cosmic order, not to 
discover how to live his life, but to approximate the entirely amoral, asocial, and ideally 
happy lives of the gods.
 
 The primary concern for both Plato and Aristotle is to identify 
the necessary conditions under which human beings will thrive.  In order to identify what 
those necessary conditions are, both rely upon a functionalistic understanding of human 
nature: human beings do best when they live in accord with their natural function or 
purpose (ergon), whatever that may be.  Absent from their writings are the notions of 
law, command, and obligation understood in relation to the basic normative claims of the 
functionalistic model.  More specifically, neither Plato nor Aristotle assert that there are 
certain normative requirements or obligations binding upon all human actions and laws 
that proceed from nature (physis) itself; and the reason for this is that neither Plato nor 
Aristotle maintain a conception of physis that could support such a claim.  Plato and 
Aristotle defend, in other words, distinct theories of natural right rather than natural law.   
 Thus in the final chapter I argue that the subsequent development of natural law 
by the Stoics was not simply an extension or further development of basic assumptions 
and commitments in Plato's and Aristotle's moral theories, as Weinreb, Kainz, and others 
have argued.  Rather, Stoic NLT developed as a direct response to the Epicurean position 
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on the central role of natural philosophy in moral theory and practical reasoning.  As 
Torquatus in Cicero's De Finibus states,  
So if the philosophy I have been describing is clearer and more brilliant than the 
sun; if it is all drawn from the fount of nature; if my whole speech gains 
credibility by being based on the uncorrupted and untainted testimony of the 
senses; if inarticulate children and even dumb beasts can, under the direction and 
guidance of nature, almost find the words to declare that there is nothing 
favorable but pleasure, and nothing unfavorable but pain – their judgment about 
such matters being neither perverted nor corrupted; if all this is so, then what a 
debt of thanks we owe to the man who, as it were, heard nature’s own voice and 
comprehended it with such power and depth that he has managed to lead all those 




A critical point is that the Stoics did not reject the Epicurean claim that metaphysics is 
foundational to moral theory (as Plato and Aristotle would have), but that metaphysics, 
along with the moral virtues, possesses only instrumental value.  Instead, the Stoics assert 
that a knowledge of nature just is moral knowledge, and in order to make this claim the 
Stoics rely upon a new "theological" conception of nature, one in which the natural order 
is understood in terms of law and divine providence.  For the Stoics, "nature's own voice" 
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HAPPINESS AND THE HUMAN FUNCTION: PLATO'S THEORY OF NATURAL 
RIGHT 
 
2.1  Some Preliminary Observations on physis in Plato and Aristotle 
 With few exceptions, the term "natural law" is absent from ancient Greek 
philosophical literature.  Helmut Koester has pointed out that the term occurs fewer than 
six times in ancient Greek writings from the pre-Socratics until Philo of Alexandra, with 
whom we see for the first time a liberal use of the term.
51
   There is apparently good 
reason for this relative absence.  The Greeks often understood the notions of nomos (law) 
and physis (nature) as opposites.  They understood nature as the realm of unchanging 
realities and eternal truths that stood in opposition to art and especially to law, the latter 
here to include all matters of custom, convention, contractual agreement, and civil 
legislation.  Thus, "the notion of natural law (nomos tes physeos)," as Leo Strauss points 
out, "is a contradiction in terms rather than a matter of course."
52
  
 However, there are three specific uses of the term worth noting.  First, in Plato's 
Gorgias Callicles argues that superior men act according to the law of nature when they 
seek a greater share of goods than others.  The second and third uses appear in Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric (1134b and 1373b-18 respectively).  In the former 
Aristotle distinguishes between "natural justice" and "legal justice"; and, in the latter, 
between "particular law" and "universal law," the latter of which he also describes as the 
"law of nature."  I focus on the passage from Plato in the present chapter and on the 
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passages from Aristotle at the outset of the chapter to follow.  With these and other 
passages in mind, my primary intention in Chapters 2 and 3 is to argue that both Plato 
and Aristotle hold that some things are good or just by nature, the position of "natural 
right" (physei dikaion).  Natural right theorists make such claims as, "It is naturally good 
(or good by nature) for person x to do action y," or "it is natural for person x to be 
inclined to do action y, because doing y is part of what x needs to do to realize his 
optimum state of well-being."  However, if we are to assert that Plato and Aristotle are 
early advocates of natural law, we must first demonstrate in their thought the technical 
use of physis that underlies the following sorts of claims: "Nature obliges person x to do 
action y and forbids person x to do any action contrary to y,"  or "at least one natural law 
requires person x to do action y and forbids person x to do any action contrary to y."  
These claims take into account that in Greek philosophic texts the notion of law or 
custom (nomos) was invariably connected with the notion of some prior author of the 
given law or custom that one is obligated to obey.  Nomos entails artifice and hence is 
closely connected with the notion of techne.  Thus, if something is to exist by nomos, it 
requires something else that intends its existence and is capable of bringing it into 
existence.  Neither Plato nor Aristotle accept such a conception of physis, I argue, and 
thus neither is a natural law theorist. 
 However, there is an immediate and rather obvious problem with the foregoing 
thesis.  Much like the English term "nature," physis admits of so wide a range of 
meanings that it appears one can discern no stable use of the term across the relevant 
philosophic texts.  At times Plato uses physis to convey the essence or distinguishing 
quality of a thing, as we find in the Philebus: "If we wanted to know the nature of any 
  23 
character, like that of hardness, would we get a better understanding if we looked at the 
hardest kinds of things rather than what has a low degree of hardness?"
53
  This sense of 
nature is closely related to Socrates' demand for the forms (eide) of things as expressed in 
his definitional questions, e.g. "What is courage?" (which one may rephrase to read: 
"What is the physis of courage?").  Similarly, in the Cratylus the correct naming of 
things, on Cratylus' naturalist view, depends upon naming "according to the nature" of 
the thing in question.
54
  His position (which, as Socrates shows, is not without problems) 
is that the nature of x is equivalent to the natural activity or function (ergon) of x, that is, 
what x does on its own without external influence, particularly human influence.  Thus, 
the correct name for x will accurately express what x does by or in accord with its own 
nature, no more and no less.  This view comes close to Aristotle's understanding of physis 
as the abstract noun cognate with phuesthai ("grow" or "be born") which serves as an 
etymological basis for insisting that anything with a nature possesses a "principle of 
motion" - that is, a natural impulse or inclination - toward a particular end.   
 Cratylus defends his naturalism against the conventionalist argument of 
Hermogenes who holds that the correct name for something amounts to nothing more 
than community agreement.
55
  Thus the main dispute in the Cratylus strongly resembles - 
and, one can hardly doubt, intentionally resembles - the central moral debate over 
whether the virtues exist by nomos or physis.  Adeimantus summarizes this debate in the 
Republic in his challenge to Socrates to demonstrate that justice "is among the greatest 
goods - those that are worth having for what comes from them but much more for 
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themselves, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, and, of course, being healthy and all the 
other goods that are fruitful by their own physis and not by opinion."
56
  It makes the most 
sense, I think, to read Adeimantus' use of physis as the one we find in Cratylus' argument.  
If so, Adeimantus' question may be rephrased to ask, "Is it natural (or naturally good) for 
a human being to be just, or should a person be just because we have agreed as a 
community that being just is right or good?"  If this rephrasing is correct, then Socrates' 
argument on behalf of the former is explicitly an argument cast in terms of natural right, 
not natural law.   
 Aside from conveying what a thing is or does by nature, however, Plato also uses 
physis to capture in a broad sense the natural world of material substances as distinct 
from the human world.    Socrates says in the Phaedrus that "landscapes and trees have 
nothing to teach me."  By this he implies that "natural science," the particular 
preoccupation of the Pre-Socratic philosophers which he elsewhere describes as the study 
of "the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists," is not 
relevant to moral discourse because it does not teach us how to live.
57
  The fundamental 
distinction between natural and moral philosophy continues (if not more clearly and 
directly) in Aristotle's argument that ethics - more specifically, the virtuous use of 
practical reason - by definition is "productive" of action (praxis), and hence is about 
making good choices.  In contrast, the use of theoretical reason to study nature reveals 
only changeless eternal truths about which we can do nothing.
58
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 But the distinction between the natural and human domains, resembling and 
perhaps in some ways overlapping the nomos/physis distinction, is at best only an 
incomplete paradigm.  A central assumption of Plato's argument in the Republic (though 
the point recurs in the Gorgias and elsewhere) is that physis may also refer to the natural 
result of a particular activity or set of conditions.  Socrates argues that when each 
member of a city has been given a task that is best suited to him, and each member 
attends only to his own task and does not meddle in the tasks of others, then "the whole 
city will naturally grow to be one and not many."
59
  The difference between this use of 
physis and Catylus' natural activity is obvious: the growth of the healthy city is not 
natural in the same sense because unlike a tree growing in the woods, untouched by 
human hand, a well-formed city requires direct human involvement.  Making this very 
point to Callicles, Socrates says that the natural result of the human body under the 
guidance of a trained doctor is health; and, likewise, under the guidance of a pastry chef 
the natural result is illness.
60
  Thus, the growth of plants and trees is an analogy of moral 
and political development only in the most general sense.  For this reason Plato's thinks 
of the physis of the guardian, for instance, as the result of both inborn talent and 
disposition (having a "gold soul") and proper habituation.
61
  Thus, although it is generally 
accurate to conceive of the nomos/physis distinction along the lines of "nature versus 
nurture," and hence to consider the two notions as generally antithetical, we do not find in 
Plato or Aristotle a uniform use of physis as that which exists or operates altogether 
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separately from human involvement and influence.
62
  In other words, a good deal of 
nurture is involved in the physis of a just person.   
 Against this broad background of physis, the most interesting, and for my 
purposes the most significant, expression of the term is in Callicles' assertion of "the law 
of nature":   
 But I believe that nature itself reveals that it's a just thing for the better man and 
 the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less 
 capable.  Nature shows that this is so in many places; both among the other 
 animals and in whole  cities and races of men, it shows that this is what justice has 
 been decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than 
 they...I believe that these [superior] men do these things in accordance with the 
 nature of what's just - yes, by  Zeus, in accordance with the law of nature, and 




Callicles' attempt to ground true human virtue (arête) in physis is stunning, not simply 
because the great majority of his fellow sophists argued that justice is entirely a matter of 
nomos, but also because his assertion appears to demand a novel conception of physis, 
one that somehow "reveals" the fundamental principles of justice (though he does not 
explain what this conception means or how it works) by way of laws that are knowable to 
humankind.  However, whether Callicles is committed to a conception of physis as 
primary and authoritative lawgiver is unclear.  Indeed, it is evident that by "law" he only 
means certain empirical regularities and does not mean to include any of the theoretical 
complexities of a preexistent legislator of nature.  Certainly Callicles relies upon a 
"functionalistic" conception of the human physis - that is, physis understood as the natural 
function or activity (ergon) of a thing - as the foundation for making claims about how 
people ought to behave if the ideal polis is to be achieved.  But how his specific 
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understanding of the specifically human physis relates to the broader notion of physis as 
"nature itself" (as he puts it) is vague.  He merely points out (1) that nature has so ordered 
things that both human beings and "the other animals" recognize that the strong ought to 
rule the weak and have a greater share of goods that bring pleasure, and (2) that human 
beings are capable of acting contrary to the "natural law" by inventing customs and laws 
that bind superior natures with such norms as "no one should get more than his fair 
share."
64
   
 However, Callicles does not explain why we must consider as unnatural the fact 
that human beings often act against the principle of superior rule.  What particular 
conception of nature must we have to bolster such a claim?  Significantly, Callicles does 
not defend his position against an obvious and relevant criticism with a further 
development of physis itself; moreover, Socrates does not seek such a metaphysical 
defense from Callicles.  This fact strongly suggests that Callicles' primary interest (which 
Socrates recognizes) is not to articulate and defend a bona fide theory of nature that can 
support his radical pseudo-natural law thesis.  Rather, his main commitment is to denying 
any claim that the human physis is essentially political and, subsequently, that the polis is 
in some sense natural rather than man-made.  On this interpretation, Callicles' use of 
natural law is non-technical and serves a largely rhetorical purpose, an approach we find 
elsewhere in Plato.  For instance, Glaucon's well-known challenge to Socrates involves a 
defense of conventional justice and a noticeably Calliclean understanding of physis that 
Glaucon himself does not advocate.  The point of Callicles' and Glaucon's arguments is 
not to construct a natural law theory of the state, but rather to articulate a conventionalist 
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theory of justice that asserts that one ought to seek the good of the state only so long as it 
serves one's interest and not a moment longer.  Such a position would, quite obviously, 
be an effective challenge to Socrates' claim that one ought always to be just, come what 
may.    
 The conventionalism of fifth century Athens  grew out of the assumption that 
earlier philosophers, by a careful study of nature, had penetrated the layers of myth and 
ancestral law that belonged to the city and had discovered an independent means to 
provide rationally justifiable explanations for various phenomena (e.g. solar eclipses, 
outbreaks of plague, and so forth).  Under this assumption, it only made sense that the 
traditional norms of the polis, long taken as the concrete expressions of the divine law 
(e.g. customary burial of kin as seen in Sophocles' Antigone), would be regarded as 
fictitious imposters of nature that serve to sever mankind from the truth of things.  As 
Allan Bloom points out, "Glaucon presents the political supplement to pre-Socratic 
natural philosophy: the city limits men in the pursuit of good things, but its only 
justification for doing so is the need to preserve itself."
65
 Thus, the nomos/physis 
dichotomy, insofar as it penetrates into the philosophic discourse of the time, was the 
essential foundation of the conventionalist argument.  It is unsurprising that a 
reconsideration of the selfsame dichotomy would figure prominently in Plato's and 
Aristotle's defenses of natural right against conventionalist objections.    
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 In the ethical thought of Plato and Aristotle, therefore, physis is a nuanced 
concept with shifting meanings.
66
  Neither perceived the need to provide an alternative 
technical conception of physis itself that would support their respective ethical claims.  
Rather, the need was for a conception of the specifically human physis that can support 
the claims of natural justice.  (Perhaps the most important of the later Stoic departures 
from the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, at least with respect to the development of 
natural law theory, is their constant assertion of a close kinship between human beings 
and nature itself, summarized by the critical term homologia.  This point is treated in 
Chapter 4.)  It did not occur to either Plato or Aristotle that nature itself must somehow 
be both normative and foundational to moral theory, that it must make certain 
authoritative ethical pronouncements, if natural justice is to be a tenable position.
67
  I 
seek to defend this claim in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
2.2  The Forms as Non-Normative 
 Regarding the role of metaphysics in ethics, the central debate between Plato and 
Aristotle concerns what practical value there is in having knowledge of the Good itself.
68
  
Plato had argued that knowing the Form of the Good somehow deepens and enriches 
one's overall virtue as nothing else can, so much so, in fact, that one cannot be truly 
virtuous and happy without this knowledge.  But it is quite reasonable to ask, as Aristotle 
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does, "how a weaver or carpenter will be helped in practicing his skill by knowing this 
good-in-itself, or how someone who has contemplated the Form itself will be a better 
doctor or general.  For apparently it is not just health the doctor attends to, but human 
health, or perhaps rather the health of a particular person, given that he treats each person 
individually."
69
  The obvious implication of Aristotle's critique is that philosophers are 
not the most qualified to be rulers, as Plato claims, because their knowledge of the Good 
is useless for all practical purposes.
70
  We need not read Aristotle as rejecting outright the 
possibility of a general definition of goodness (he consistently relies upon a 
functionalistic conception of goodness that we find in Socratic arguments, e.g. a good 
ship is a ship that functions well according to its natural purpose as a ship); nor is he 
objecting to the Socratic principle that the genuine expert of a particular discipline must 
possess complete authority within that discipline, and all others must submit to that 
authority.  He objects, rather, to the idea that philosopher-kings (qua philosophers) have 
morally relevant knowledge at all.  More specifically, he rejects the view that normative 
truth is contained in (or "built into") the content of the theoretical or "scientific" 
understanding of the natural philosopher.  He does so because the Forms which are the 
objects of the philosophers' expertise, being permanent and universal, do not contain 
content that is relevant for how one ought to handle the practical and highly particular 
matters of human life, all of which occur in the ever fluctuating context of space and 
time.
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 Along similar lines, some modern scholars have suggested that Plato developed 
his metaphysics, his theory of the Forms in particular, as a post hoc foundation for the 
radical moral claims of Socrates, claims that are assumed to be otherwise incomplete or 
untenable.
71
  On this interpretation, Socrates' bold claims, e.g. that one is better off 
suffering injustice than committing it and that one is better off suffering just punishment 
than escaping it, rise and fall depending on the soundness of the theory of Forms 
advanced in the Republic.  Implied in this interpretation is a developmental view of 
Plato's Dialogues: Socrates (or early Plato) entertained stunning and revolutionary ethical 
notions but had no final secure grounding for them until a more mature Plato could 
provide it with a new metaphysical theory.  Although the developmentalist interpretation 
of Plato differs widely from Aristotle's interpretation, both assume that Plato understood 
the Forms to contain content relevant to the moral agent in his attempt to answer the 
question, "Should I do x or should I do y?"                      
 However, the developmentalist reading  may not be the best way to approach 
Plato.  For one thing,  Plato may not have intended to assert so close a connection 
between metaphysics and ethics.  To be sure, we can hardly think that Plato did not 
envision some relation between the two realms such that, in a very general sense, moral 
excellence depends upon a correct view of reality.  Aristotle could hardly be said to 
disagree: his normative anthropology consists in the claim that what is good for a human 
being depends on what will contribute to the overall fulfillment of the natural ends of 
human nature.  Quite clearly, then, Plato's critics assert a much stronger connection 
between the metaphysical and the ethical, one that has Plato assert that the philosopher is 
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morally excellent or possesses moral knowledge because of what he has apprehended in 
his study of the Forms.  This claim is closely associated with the stronger intellectualist 
claim of Socrates that moral excellence just is moral knowledge, and moral knowledge 
just is the theoretical knowledge of the philosopher (as the Stoics would later insist).  On 
this interpretation of Plato, the philosopher is uniquely qualified to rule the city because 
his knowledge of the Forms yields the necessary normative insight in the same way that 
the pilot of a ship, and the pilot alone, possesses the knowledge requisite for seafaring 
and is thus naturally qualified to take the helm.   
 But what is the content of the pilot's knowledge, and in what way is it analogous 
to the philosopher's knowledge?  In the Republic Plato has Socrates say that "it is not 
because of sailing that he is called a pilot but because of his art and his rule over 
sailors."
72
  He develops the meaning of the pilot's art later on: "[F]or the true pilot it is 
necessary to pay careful attention to year, seasons, heaven, stars, winds, and everything 
that's proper to the art, if he is really going to be skilled at ruling a ship."
73
  Quite clearly, 
Socrates holds that the pilot is the master of sailors because he knows best what is 
required for successful navigation and thus the crew ought to heed his authority.  Less 
clear is how the pilot's particular seafaring knowledge itself equips him for the task of 
successfully ruling a ship.  It is difficult to see, as Aristotle observes, how the pilot's 
ability to read the heavens and gauge the winds (and other such skills) would help him 
keep subordinate sailors on task, resolve disputes, manage illnesses, and other likely 
challenges.  That kind of knowledge and ability must, it would seem, come some other 
way.  Plato admits as much by making clear that the knowledge of the true pilot is 
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insufficient for commanding respect and obedience on a ship: "the true pilot will really be 
called a stargazer, a prater and useless to [the crew]" by his own crewmembers.
74
  His 
point is that because of the pilot's expertise he ought to be heeded; and, thus, the best 
crew, or the one most likely to achieve maritime success, is the one whose subordinates 
are already inclined to heed the commands of the true pilot.  That Plato fails to develop 
what is involved in the skill of ruling, and does not answer such important questions as 
how subordinate sailors are to know that the true pilot possesses the requisite knowledge 
apart from having that knowledge themselves, makes plain that those are side-issues for 
him. We may balk at the claim that the true pilot is simultaneously the best commander 
of a ship, but that does not require us to attribute to Plato the stronger and much more 
questionable claim (one I believe he rejects), that the content of the pilot's knowledge qua 
pilot is both necessary and sufficient for virtuous rule on board a ship.   
  Plato's Socrates takes the point of the analogy to be obvious: the true philosopher, 
like the pilot, possesses precisely the sort of knowledge necessary for guiding a city to a 
flourishing condition; and, furthermore, without his leadership, without his complete 
authority, the city will forever be entangled by false conceptions of justice and its citizens 
that much less happy for that fact.
75
  But what does the philosopher know?  For Plato, the 
philosopher does not merely apprehend "that which is," or the eternal Forms, which are 
eternally perfect and hence are not subject to generation and decay.  The more important 
point is that the philosopher is disposed to appreciate permanent things, that his character 
is of a certain shape, formed by years of education that began with training in music and 
gymnastic.  He is not inclined to regard faddish things of the polloi, nor is he at all 
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interested in temporary gains and praises of the moment.  The philosopher is preoccupied 
with the permanent and unfading things of the world, and because of this he is not only 
the happiest of men but also the best qualified to see to it that the city as a whole would 
enjoy something of the goodness of activities that seek lasting or permanent goods, 
however possible such may be in the concrete physical world.  Plato adds the key point 
that the philosopher, once freed from the cave and enlightened, does not want to rule and 
thus is best fit to rule.  The suggestion here is that the philosopher's character or moral 
disposition and not his theoretical insight is of primary importance when it comes to 
political rule.
76
   
 So much would indicate, apparently, that Plato rejects what may be called 
political knowledge or "political science," preferring to see it as a matter of developed 
skill or technê rather than a matter of epistêmê.  But the distinction between technê and 
epistêmê in Plato is a dubious one, so often does he blur the distinction.  In Charmides, 
for example, Socrates says that the doctor's craft (iatrikê technê) is the epistêmê of health.  
Similarly in the Gorgias the primary contrast to technê is not knowledge but knack or 
experience (empeiria), the latter having no knowledge "of the nature of whatever things it 
applies by which it applies them."
77
  Implied in the Gorgias is the point that technê 
admits of a certain kind of knowledge but one limited to the nature or form of the 
craftsman's particular discipline, implying that his knowledge is specialized.  The doctor, 
to be a genuine doctor, must have knowledge of the form of health, the ideal state of the 
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human body; but his knowledge qua doctor will not help him in other parts of his life.  It 
will not help him repair a roof or heal a broken friendship.  Analogously, one would think 
the statesman must have knowledge of the form of the polis to be a true statesman.  What 
is hardly obvious is why the philosopher, whose knowledge qua philosopher is not about 
political matters or the state itself, nor about one specific area of daily human life, but 
instead concerns the eternal and unchanging realities of the cosmos, is best qualified to 
rule.  What is the basis of his political technê?  There appears to be a breakdown in the 
technê-based analogy that Plato has relied upon so heavily.   
 However, we might do well to remember that, for Plato, the question of political 
rule is authoritarian in nature: who is most capable of guiding the lives of others?  It must 
be, he assumes, perhaps problematically, that the one who best manages his own life is 
best able to manage the lives of others.  Julia Annas makes an observation along similar 
lines: "The authoritarianism of the Republic's claim about a philosopher's moral 
knowledge springs not from their intellectual training, nor from grasp of the Form of the 
Good, but from Socrates' idea that you should do what the expert says."
78
  Annas' 
contention is that the authority of the expert, be it the doctor or the pilot or the 
philosopher, is an epistemological authority, ultimately rooted not in the content of the 
expert's knowledge but in the fact that he is the expert of his field and thus, whether one 
understands the expert or not, one ought to listen to him.
79
  Annas' point has strength, 
particularly when one keeps in mind that Plato does not allow for individual autonomy in 
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such matters: the patient should listen to the doctor, not because he understands 
something about health and sees that the doctor does too, but because the doctor is the 
expert and he is not.  Just as the doctor is the expert of the body, the philosopher is the 
expert of the soul, which fact is the reason why Socrates in Theages urges young men to 
care for the state of their souls before embarking on politics: they can hardly care for the 
souls of others if they fail to care properly for their own.   
 But how the foregoing argument answers the apparent breakdown in the analogy 
is difficult to see: if the power to manage the lives of others should be given to those who 
best manage their own lives, it follows that the best doctor is not the one who best 
understands health but the one who is healthiest.  But Plato never makes this suggestion.  
In the Gorgias, for instance, the pastry baker differs from the doctor because he does not 
know what he is doing (or more precisely, he does not understand the nature of his 
activity); moreover, because the baker lacks the relevant knowledge concerning the 
human body, he utilizes his knowledge of what people will enjoy and thus produces 
gratification rather than health.
80
  What makes the doctor an expert, then, is not that he is 
healthiest but that he understands what is necessary for good health and is capable of 
guiding people to that end.  Even if we assume that with such knowledge the doctor 
would be healthy too - a precarious assumption, it seems to me - the assumption is 
irrelevant for the point that Socrates is making, one that insists upon an understanding of 
technê as knowledge-based expertise.  In the Meno, for example, Socrates argues that by 
knowledge statesmen effectively guide their cities.
81
  However, Plato never suggests that 
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the philosopher's understanding of the Forms in particular entails moral knowledge, more 
specifically, knowledge of the mechanics of daily life in the polis in its ideal condition.  
In this light I believe it best to consider the technê-based analogy as limited: the analogy 
is useful as a general image of the nature of authority, but also one that Plato must 
eschew in order to maintain, as I think he does, that the Forms are non-normative through 
and through and thus it cannot be by knowledge of them simplicitur that the philosopher 
knows how to rule.   
  What basis, then, does one have for asserting the non-normativity of the Forms?  
One might argue that the transformative experience of the philosopher, having entered 
into an enlightened state following the long, steep path out of the cave, will have some 
impact on his understanding of value.  How else are we to explain the prominent place of 
metaphysics and epistemology in the Republic than as foundational for what the 
philosopher thinks is good?  Richard Kraut, for example, has argued that the Forms play 
a central role in Plato's defense of justice because one who apprehends the Forms is alone 
capable of avoiding the pernicious assumption that such material goods as pleasure and 
power are the only goods.
82
  Because the philosopher's attitudes are transformed by his 
love of the Forms as a radically different kind of good, he is no longer prone to those 
antisocial tendencies of those for whom worldly goods are the only kind of good.
83
  In 
Kraut's interpretation, then, it appears that Plato (in contrast to Aristotle) believes human 
beings do not possess a natural inclination toward social behavior independent of selfish 
and utilitarian motives.  Rather, human beings acquire a genuine (non-utilitarian) desire 
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for harmonious social order only after an education in the Forms.  The philosopher 
apprehends in the Forms a certain orderliness that he loves and desires to implement in 
the world about him apart from considerations of personal gain.  Thus, the philosopher's 
desire to rule is the natural result of his enlightenment, and does not arise through 
compulsion.  "So it is clear," Kraut writes, "that when the philosophers rule, they do not 
stop looking to or imitating the Forms.  Rather, their imitative activity is no longer 
merely contemplative; instead, they start acting in a way that produces a harmony in the 
city that is a likeness of the harmony of the Forms."
84
  He immediately adds that if the 
philosophers were to refuse to rule, they would be allowing disorder in the city to 
increase, a result they would naturally abhor: "And in creating this disharmony, the 
philosopher would in one respect cease to imitate the Forms."
85
    
 Kraut's interpretation is problematic for two main reasons.  First, although he 
offers a rather sensible response to critics of Plato's philosopher-kings, the suggestion that 
philosophers rule willingly as an extension of contemplative activity does not appear to 
be one Plato himself offers.  Kraut is aware of the potential difficulty for his 
interpretation and is right to attempt an explanation of 520a-521b of the Republic.  Here 
Glaucon asks Socrates whether the founders of the imaginary city would be doing an 
injustice by forcing philosophers to rule and thereby compelling them to live "a worse 
life when a better is possible for them."  Kraut's take on the passage depends almost 
entirely on Socrates' remark that "each of [the philosophers] will certainly approach 
ruling as a necessary thing - which is the opposite of what is done by those who now rule 
in every city."  Socrates' suggestion is that the philosophers rule willingly out of a 
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perceived need.
86
  Indeed, Kraut's account noticeably diminishes the role of compulsion 
in Socrates' position almost to the point of irrelevance.  Yet the compulsion of the 
philosophers to rule, which presupposes that philosophers do not want to rule and would 
not rule unless forced to do so, is essential, I think, to Socrates' argument.  In 519c-d 
Socrates states that it is "likely and necessary...that those who have been allowed to spend 
their time in education continuously to the end...won't be willing to act, believing  they 
have emigrated to a colony on the Isles of the Blessed."  Thus it follows, Socrates argues, 
that  
 our job as founders is to compel the best natures to go to the study which we were 
 saying before is the greatest, to see the good and to go up that ascent; and, when 
 they have gone up and seen sufficiently, not to permit them what is now 
 permitted...[T]o remain there and not be willing to go down again among those 
 prisoners or share their labors and honors, whether they be slighter or more 
 serious. 
 
Nowhere does Socrates suggest Kraut's point that true philosophers would naturally 
detest the disorder of their cities and want to do something about it, lest they fail in some 
way to emulate the order of the Forms in political life.  The philosopher's entrance into 
political affairs, rather, comes by way of injunction; otherwise it appears the philosophers 
are unconcerned about the ebb and flow of the city.  At bottom, Kraut seems to overlook 
Plato's commitment to the claim that living like the gods is necessary and sufficient for 
happiness.   
 Second, if we are to assume that Plato held metaphysics to be an essential 
foundation for the sort of practical knowledge necessary for governance, then he says 
surprisingly little about this connection.  How a metaphysical comprehension of the 
Forms in turn shapes the content of the philosopher's moral theory is nowhere developed 
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in Plato's writings.  Indeed, unlike Aristotle, Plato does not develop a theory of practical 
rationality, one in which the moral agent utilizes his calculative intellect rather than his 
theoretic intellect.  Consequently, Kraut can say very little on the subject beyond the 
vague suggestion that philosophers "start acting in a way that produces a harmony in the 
city that is a likeness of the harmony of the Forms."
87
  But this claim only serves to 
highlight the fact that it would be stunning if the course of study Plato outlines for the 
philosopher, focusing as it does on a radically abstract and mathematical kind of 
intellectual training, should turn out to possess normative value for the statesman.
88
  That 
Plato would be silent on such a radical thesis strikes me as unlikely, especially when it is 
equally plausible to read Plato as arguing that it is precisely a departure (though not a 
permanent one) from the mundane and transient features of everyday life that he has in 
mind for the philosopher.  The central point of this interpretation is that the philosopher's 
education is valuable, not because it enlightened him to the fundamental mechanics of the 
polis, but rather because it made clear to him that the polis is not all that there is, nor is it 
by any stretch the most important thing there is.
89
    
 Plato does assert the thesis that to possess complete virtue one must be a 
philosopher.  But he does not say or imply that only philosophers are virtuous people or 
are the only ones who correctly understand virtue.  For Plato to accept the stronger claim, 
he must show how the Forms directly and substantially alter the content of the virtuous 
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person's ethical understanding.  That Plato never offers such a defense strongly suggests 
that the ancient scholarly tradition was correct in supposing that Plato treats ethics and 
metaphysics as independent topics.
90
  The Stoics, for instance, would find no problems in 
simultaneously accepting Plato's ethics and rejecting his metaphysics.  Ancient Platonist 
scholars such as Alcinous were in the habit of treating Plato's ethical commitments, e.g. 
that virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness, as entirely independent claims that 
did not rise or fall with the soundness of his metaphysical claims, particularly those 
concerning the theory of Forms.
91
   
 
2.3  Does Human Nature Have a Social Function? 
 Thus far I have interpreted Plato as having taken for granted that politics, or the 
art of getting along well with fellow members of one's polis, is an entirely natural activity 
for a human being to pursue.  I have presented him as one who believes in seeking the 
good for one's city, not merely out of self-interest (as Glaucon's argument would have it), 
but genuinely and wholeheartedly as Socrates argues in the Apology.  Callicles and 
Glaucon both insisted that nature gives us a desire for power and pleasure, and only by 
conventional agreement does one advocate living justly by obeying the laws of one's city.  
Thus, Plato's argument on behalf of justice apparently must depend upon a claim that 
concerns the naturalness of being just, which is another way of affirming that man is 
political by nature and not by convention.   
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 But one plausible reading of Plato sees him as an ethical intellectualist: the 
position that morality amounts to knowing the truth.  In the Meno, where Plato presents 
the intellectualist position most clearly, Socrates argues that one always does what one 
believes to be good and thus implies that knowledge of what is good is both necessary 
and sufficient for moral virtue.
 92
  This reading of Plato is rooted in his assumption that 
human beings are ultimately (or essentially) intellects, and thus the human business is to 
contemplate the Forms - that is, to do what the gods do and to become what the gods are.  
The theme of "becoming like God," notably pronounced in the Theaetetus, was a favorite 
among ancient Platonists and such Christian thinkers as Athanasius.
93
  Assuming the 
intellectualist interpretation of Plato is correct, it follows that human beings, like the 
gods, are hardly social creatures by nature, though we might be out of convention 
because of certain circumstantial need.  In other words, human nature lacks a clear social 
function (ergon) that must be realized for its own sake if people are to be happy.  But if 
attending to political and social concerns is a mere circumstantial and temporary 
necessity, a mere means to some other end, then how do we account for the extensive 
treatment Plato gives to social and political issues, particularly in the Republic and the 
Laws?   More specifically, what purpose could Plato's political discourse serve if not to 
demonstrate the proper fulfillment of a basic social function of human nature? 
 Some scholars, following the ancient scholarly tradition, have argued that the 
Republic is not a work of political philosophy where the ideal form of state is the primary 
concern.
 94
  Rather, Plato's central concern is the moral status of the individual human 
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soul, specifically, what the best form of soul is, the form that will yield optimal 
happiness.  This moral (or perhaps "eudaimonistic") reading of the text presupposes that 
the Republic is either a predominantly ethical text or a predominantly political text but 
cannot be both equally.  Desmond Lee has rejected this presupposition, suggesting that 
the work "is as much about ethics and education and philosophy as about politics in the 
strict sense."
95
  Lee makes this claim so as to deflect some of what he correctly sees as an 
overly political reading of the Republic by many modern scholars.  But Lee also regards 
the text as a teaching manual that Plato developed primarily for use in his Academy.  
Thus, the text does not represent a sustained and systematic inquiry into a single 
philosophical topic, but rather an introduction to a wide variety of topics without any 
underlying or unifying theme.  However, the fact that there is a such a range of topics in 
the text does not in itself undermine (as Lee apparently assumes) the possibility that the 
central question of justice - namely, what it is and why it is supremely good - unifies the 
text by grounding the various topics in the purpose of demonstrating why the philosopher 
is the happiest individual.          
 The eudaimonistic reading of the Republic relies on a particular assumption about 
the overall argument structure that Socrates employs in the text, one essentially 
analogical and rooted in work Socrates undertakes in Book II.  Socrates suggests that to 
understand the nature of the just and the unjust as it exists in the individual, an image 
(eikon) is necessary, one that will illustrate justice on a larger scale, namely, as it would 
exist in a city.
96
  Thus, the purpose of the entire subsequent conversation, centering on the 
soul-state analogy, is to gain an understanding of what it means for the individual to be 
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just and why such an individual would be happiest of all; moreover, the task of imagining 
the ideally just city is useful only insofar as it throws light on the ideally just individual.
97
  
As a result, we cannot assume that Socrates is committed to the picture of the ideal polis 
as he describes it in Books III-V, that is, as a picture that contains genuine features of 
what we might call Platonic political theory.  There are places, for example, where one 
might well suspect Socratic irony regarding the city, perhaps most notably in Book V 
which Bloom regards as Socratic comedy akin to Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae.
98
  Book V 
begins with a recapitulation of the opening scene of the dialogue: Polemarchus joining 
with Adeimantus (and this time they have added Glaucon and Thryasymachus) to "arrest" 
Socrates and compel him to explain how the citizens of the city could have all things in 
common, including women and children.  The political model is similar to the Spartan 
regime which is both familiar and attractive to his Laconophile interlocutors.  However, 
as Allan Bloom observes, while Socrates' interlocutors are absorbed by questions of how 
the actualization of this city is to occur, he "expects [his suggestions about the full 
equality of men and women] to be ridiculed....[to] provoke both laughter and rage in its 
contempt for convention and nature, in its wounding of all the dearest sensibilities of 
masculine pride and shame, the family, and statesmanship and the city."
99
  Bloom 
concludes that Book V "can only be understood as Socrates' response to his most 
dangerous accuser, Aristophanes, and his contest with him."
100
  Whether or not Bloom's 
final point is accurate, Socrates clearly attempts, at least in part, to expose the faulty 
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assumption of his interlocutors that the construction of the imaginary city is the necessary 
prologue a discussion regarding the actualization of the ideal city in the concrete physical 
world.  Thus, Book V serves as a reminder of the analogical purpose of the concept of the 
ideal state. 
 Building from Bloom's observation, Plato may not have been committed to the 
claim that the best city must be ruled by philosopher-kings.  We find, for example, that 
the philosopher of the Theaetetus is inept in all practical matters.  He cannot find the 
agora or the law courts.  He is ignorant about the laws and the political struggles and 
personalities of his time.  In short, he is like Thales who fell into a well while 
contemplating the heavens.
101
  "Only his body lives and sleeps in the city," while his 
mind is absorbed with the eternal Forms in his singular pursuit to "make all haste to 
escape from earth to heaven; and escape means becoming as like God as possible; and a 
man becomes like God when he becomes just and pure, with understanding."
102
  The 
philosopher as presented here, one who cannot navigate his way to the most important 
places of the city, is hardly a qualified ruler, much less an ideal one.  If we are to accept 
Plato's philosopher-king as a genuine thesis of political theory, then we must show either 
that in the Republic Plato boldly announces a new conception of the philosopher, and 
thereby rejects the older one of the Theaetetus, or that the philosopher of the Theaetetus 
is not a true philosopher and that Plato never meant to represent him as one.  Even if we 
accept the developmentalist thesis, however, the former suggestion fails for the fact that 
the Theaetetus is not an early dialogue, and for all we know may be as "late" as the 
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Republic, if not later.  It follows, then, that we would have just as much evidence to argue 
that the philosopher of the Theaetetus is the later one, the one that reflects the more 
developed and mature thought of Plato.  The latter suggestion also suffers from want of 
evidence: we have no reason to doubt that Socrates' philosopher in the Theaetetus is a 
bona fide philosopher because Socrates never suggests otherwise.  In fact, Socrates 
explicitly identifies political rule among the "common things" of the world which the 
good and wise man, i.e. the philosopher, must escape in his pursuit to be as much like 
God as possible.
103
    
 But perhaps the two philosophers are not as dissimilar as at first glance.  The 
philosopher of the Theaetetus may just be one who has yet to realize his political 
obligations, or has yet to be compelled to enter political life as the Republic describes.  
He may just be a genuine philosopher, a true contemplator of the eternal Forms, but an 
incomplete one;  thus, there is no necessary reason to dispose of the philosopher-king in 
the overall scheme of Plato's political theory.  This approach is in line with the foregoing 
interpretation of Richard Kraut who has argued that the Platonic notions of becoming like 
God and exercising political rule are not mutually exclusive.  The contemplative life of 
the philosopher, "in the open air illuminated by the Form of the Good," trains the 
philosopher's character to love just things and to seek just things in the world about him 
(and likewise to detest disorder and to seek a remedy for disorderly things in the world).  
Philosophical training, in fact, turns out to be precisely the sort of training that politicians 
need to do their job well because it inculcates in them a love of justice rather than a love 
of power, gain, or praise.  It follows for Kraut, then, that the political life does not stand 
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in contrast to the philosophical life, as though one must give up contemplation to rule; 
instead, political rule is a natural result of the philosophical life.  Kraut states that for the 
philosopher-king, the life of imitating the Forms "is no longer merely 
contemplative...instead, [he] starts acting in a way that produces a harmony in the city 
that is a likeness of the harmony of the Forms."
104
  Kraut adds that the true philosopher 
realizes that his political inactivity "creates a certain disharmony in the world...And in 
creating this disharmony, the philosopher would in one respect cease to imitate the 
Forms.  She would gaze at the order that is appropriate among the Forms but would 
thereby upset an order that is appropriate among human beings."
105
 
 To suggest that Plato intended the point that philosophers in some way create or 
cause disorder in the human political world by their abdication is almost certainly an 
exaggeration.  Plato is quite clear that the lower parts of the city, as with the lower parts 
of the soul, are disorderly on their own,  that is, by nature and not by consequence of 
some prior condition.  Hence, although it may be true that the philosopher is the person 
most qualified to promote order within the city (again, a claim that is itself questionable), 
it does not follow that (1) the philosopher in any way causes disorder by not taking on 
power, and (2) that the philosopher in any way desires such power as a natural result of 
his enlightenment.  As I have argued, Plato is explicit that the true philosopher does not 
desire political power and thus he must be compelled to rule.
106
  An additional drawback 
to Kraut's reading is that because he limits his discussion to the Republic and does not 
consider the philosopher of the Theaetetus, he fails to address the problem of reconciling 
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the two accounts.  What is more, Kraut does not address the key point that, according to 
Plato, the gods are asocial and apolitical beings; thus, it is not obvious how the 
philosopher, insofar as he is an imitator of the gods, would somehow naturally desire to 
take on political power.   
 According to the eudaimonistic reading, therefore, Plato's claim regarding 
philosopher-kings could only be intentionally ridiculous - that is, ridiculous as a claim of 
political theory - because his primary purpose is not to illustrate some truth about the 
"outward" earthly polis but a truth about the inward polis of the individual soul.  Socrates 
makes this point explicitly toward the end of Book IV:  
 But in truth justice was something [like the model]; however, not with respect to a 
 man's minding his external business, but with respect to what is within, with 
 respect to what truly concerns him and his own.  He doesn't let each part in him 
 mind other people's business or the three classes in the soul meddle with each 
 other, but really sets his own house in good order and rules himself; he arranges 
 himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts, exactly like 
 three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest, and middle.
107
 
The rule of philosophers in the ideal city turns out to be a concrete analogical way for 
Plato to illustrate that individuals are to be ruled by their intellect.  By extension, the 
tripartite composition of the state, made up of guardians (rulers), auxiliaries, and laborers, 
is an image of the tripartite composition of the individual soul consisting in the rational, 
spirited, and appetitive aspects, each with its own appropriate virtue (wisdom, courage, 
and self-restraint, respectively), by which each aspect can do its particular task well.  We 
find Socrates, as late as Book IX, continuing to develop the tripartite arrangement of the 
state in explicitly analogical terms in order to explain the desires or pleasures specific to 
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each part: "just as a city is divided into three forms, so the soul of every single man also 
is divided in three...It looks as though there were also a threefold division of pleasures 
corresponding to these three, a single pleasure peculiar to each one; and similarly a 
threefold division of desires and kinds of rule."
108
  Each part must be properly 
harmonized such that the "truly musical man" (by which Socrates means the truly just 
man) "looks fixedly at the regime within him and guards against upsetting anything in it 
by possession of too much or too little substance."
109
 
 One can nonetheless argue that Plato needs to establish the best form of state, not 
merely to serve the analogical argument of illustrating the best form of soul, but to show 
why the happiness of the philosopher depends to a degree on the quality of the state in 
which he finds himself.  This thesis implies that justice is not sufficient for happiness 
after all.  Arguing for the "comparative thesis," Terence Irwin suggests that although the 
philosopher is always happier than the non-virtuous person all things being equal, the 
philosopher does not enjoy optimal happiness apart from the favorable conditions 
afforded him by the ideal political community; consequently, the ideal regime is 
supposed to constitute one part of Socrates' main argument in the dialogue.
110
  Irwin's 
suggestion has the obvious advantage of attributing to Plato a more likely thesis, one that 
avoids the radical claim that the philosopher in the worst possible political regime - one 
in which he is regarded as the most unjust of men and thus deserving of the worst 
possible punishments - is still happier than the most unjust of men in the best possible 
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political situation, one in which he is regarded as the most just of men and thus worthy of 
all appropriate honors.   
 We cannot doubt, however, that Socrates does defend the radical position, known 
by modern scholars as the "sufficiency thesis," in Books I and II.  In response to 
Glaucon's challenge (358b-362c), Socrates must argue that the perfectly just individual - 
that is, the person who truly is just and yet "is stripped of everything except justice" and 
thus is given the greatest reputation for injustice with all the terrible consequences of that 
reputation - is still happier than the perfectly unjust individual who, though thoroughly 
unjust, seems just to everyone and consequently enjoys unlimited access to conventional 
goods.  So long as one understands Glaucon's challenge as the primary context for 
interpreting Socrates' main argument for justice, the comparative thesis suffers.  
Glaucon's demand is not for Socrates to show that the just individual is the happiest 
individual all things being equal, but that the just individual is happiest come what may.  
Irwin's position, therefore, turns out to depend on the developmentalist assumption that 
what Socrates defends early in the dialogue he eventually abandons later on.
111
   
 Evidence for Irwin's claim is lacking.  At no point in Book II or beyond does 
Socrates answer the obvious question of the comparative claim, noted by Annas, of how 
virtue can somehow have the power to make the just man happier than the unjust man 
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and yet not quite enough power to make the just man happy.
112
  Moreover, at a key 
juncture in Book II Adeimantus offers a summary of the challenge to Socrates:  
 Now, don't only show us by the argument that justice is stronger than injustice, 
 but show what each in itself does to the man who has it that makes the one bad 
 and the other good.  And take away the reputations, as Glaucon told you to...Now, 
 since you agreed that justice is among the greatest goods - those that are worth 
 having for what comes from them but much more for themselves... - praise this 
 aspect of justice.
113
 
Socrates' central thesis, at least as far as Adeimantus is concerned, is the sufficiency 
thesis - the same thesis, Adeimantus adds, Socrates has held since his exchange with 
Thrasymachus in Book I.  That Adeimantus refers back  to Socrates' exchange with 
Thrasymachus is important because it suggests that Socrates' thesis has not been revised.  
Adeimantus in no way indicates, either in Book II or beyond, that he expects Socrates to 
show that the just man is happier than the unjust all things being equal.  Thus, for the 
comparative claim to be correct, Adeimantus must be wrong about Socrates' position, at 
least in this passage.  But Socrates provides no indication, here or elsewhere, that such a 
misunderstanding has taken place.  Indeed, Socrates responds to Adeimantus' demand 
with the initial sketch of the analogical argument for justice, thus implying that Glaucon 
and Adeimantus understood the central issue quite well.   
 The comparative thesis also fails to explain some of Socrates' remarks late in the 
Republic.  If we suppose he abandoned the thesis at some point, we must somehow 
account for Socrates' explicit return to the "inner city" as the analogical image of the 
unconditionally good and happy soul in the final two Books.
114
  In pointing out, for 
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example, that "a man is like his city" so that "the same arrangement [in a tyrannical city] 
be in him and that his soul be filled with much slavery and illiberality," Socrates makes 
clear that his purpose in describing the tyrannical state was to make clear the miserable 
condition of the "tyrannic soul."
115
  In Book X (612b-d), a passage Irwin takes to imply 
that the just man will secure happiness only when certain "external goods" have been 
added to his justice, we in fact find Socrates urging a return to and a reconsideration of 
the original hypothetical challenge of Glaucon.  Just prior to the passage that Irwin has in 
mind, Glaucon accepts the sufficiency claim that "justice by itself is best for the soul 
itself, and that the soul must do just things, whether it has Gyges' ring or not, and, in 
addition to such a ring, Hades' cap."
116
  From this agreement, Socrates then recommends 
a revision of Glaucon's original challenge, one that reflects what is most appropriate, 
namely, "to give back to justice and the rest of virtue the wages...that they procure for the 
soul from human beings and gods, both while the human being is still alive and when he 
is dead."
117
  Socrates' point is that it is right or appropriate that the just man receive 
appropriate honors and "wages," not that his happiness still depends upon such things.  
For Socrates to imply that the just man would not be happy apart from these additional 
conventional goods, we must assume, as Irwin apparently does, that Socrates intends a 
further commentary on eudaimonism, an intention that the passage and its context simply 
do not warrant.  Rather, Socrates clearly assumes that that discussion is  finished, that he 
has won Glaucon's agreement, and that the radical (sufficiency) thesis must stand.  The 
truly just man is happier than anyone else, come what may.   
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 If, as I have argued, Plato defends the sufficiency thesis, and if he holds that "the 
human ergon," as Michael J. White puts it, "is to understand or know the truth - period," 
then it becomes difficult to see a specifically social component in Plato's conception of 
the human ergon.  That the just man or philosopher is devoted to a proper ordering of his 
inner city is clear.  But why must he also be devoted to the proper ordering of the "outer" 
regime in which he lives?  If we are to read Socrates as being genuinely devoted to the 
good of his state, as he claims in the Apology and the Crito, it is not all that clear why he 
should be.  In fact, White points out that on Plato's view both biological and social 
realities can deflect us from fulfilling the human ergon; thus, he rightly concludes that 
"[t]his fact makes for an ambivalent attitude on Plato's part to the place of the political in 
human life."
118
   
 If I have been right in asserting that the knowledge of Plato's philosopher affords 
the philosopher no additional insight or wisdom in ethical and political matters, it is hard 
to see how we could regard Plato as an advocate of natural law.  If the philosopher pays 
attention to the state, concerning himself with its affairs, he does so not because nature 
obligates him or his happiness in any way depends upon doing so.  Quite broadly, then, 
we might say that while nature is at the heart of Plato's ethical thought, ethics broadly 
construed is absent from his conception of nature.  The same is true, we shall see, of 
Aristotle. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A REVISED CASE FOR NATURAL RIGHT: CONTEMPLATION AND MORAL 
VIRTUE IN ARISTOTLE 
 
3.1  Nicomachean Ethics V.7 and Rhetoric I.13 
 
 In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle's moral theory should be understood as a 
revised version of Plato's core thesis of natural right rather than as a version of NLT.  
Unlike Plato, Aristotle's functionalistic anthropology contains an explicit social 
dimension (entailed by his claim that "man is a social animal") and thus part of human 
flourishing, according to Aristotle, must presumably incorporate social or political 
activity.  In addition, in at least two places Aristotle apparently affirms a conception of 
natural justice which, according to some scholars, amounts to an affirmation of NLT.
 119
   
My first priority is to look closely at these two passages. 
 In the first passage, V.7 of the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE), Aristotle 
distinguishes between justice that is natural (phusikon) and justice that is legal (nomikon).  
Although the text is notoriously perplexing, Tony Burns takes it as obvious that 
Aristotle's main purpose is to reject the view that all of political justice is merely 
conventional or legal and that the primary scholarly task is one of reconstructing 
Aristotle's view on the relation between natural law and positive law.
120
  On this reading, 
Aristotle intends by natural justice to include all the timeless and changeless moral 
principles that have universal validity and authority in human societies everywhere and at 
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all times.  In this context, Burns argues, one must understand Aristotle's claim that what 
is naturally just "has the same force everywhere and does not depend on people's 
thinking."
121
   
 However, Aristotle later adds that what is natural is nevertheless changeable, 
despite the fact that "some things are so by nature, and others are not."
122
  Just prior to 
this statement, Aristotle seems to reject the common view that what is just is always 
changing whereas what is natural is "unchangeable and has the same force everywhere, 
as fire burns both here and in Persia."
123
  But he goes on to say that while the gods would 
also reject this claim, "among us, though there is such a thing as what is natural, 
everything is nevertheless changeable; but still some things are so by nature, and others 
are not."
124
  Aristotle's point is that some things exist or occur "by nature" even though 
they appear to us to be changeable and that among these things are the principles of 
natural justice.  His emphasis, then, is on the mistaken impressions people have about 
matters of justice and law, specifically, that they are entirely a matter of local conditions 
and thus entirely a matter of convention, and in this sense those principles are 
changeable.  However, Burns reads Aristotle as saying that the principles of natural 
justice are changeable only insofar as they have differing expressions or applications 
once they have been incorporated and codified in the form of positive law by every 
society.
125
  In other words, the changeability of natural justice comes in the codification 
process and, apparently, has nothing to do with human perception, despite Aristotle's 
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remarks to the contrary.  Indeed, Burns' point is not one that Aristotle himself makes or 
implies, but rather reflects complications that emerge in later developments of moral and 
legal theory, most notably by the Stoics who struggled with the problem of codification 
of natural law.
126
  Aristotle may have anticipated that problem, of course, but there is at 
least as much evidence for the interpretation that he anticipated a separate development 
centered on the claim that there exists what would later be called a "jus gentium" 
alongside various forms of "jus civile."  On this reading, there is insufficient grounds for 
asserting a natural law reading of Aristotle for the fact that a "law of nations" does not 
itself guarantee that there is a lex naturalis.  At best, Burns shows that a basic framework 
for natural law theory might possibly be mapped onto NE V.7, and thus Aristotle's 
position is ultimately consistent with that of natural law.    
 Even then I have my doubts.  The Greek term we are translating as "natural 
justice" could not be rendered as "natural law" without introducing fundamental problems 
in our understanding of Aristotle.  As I argued in the previous chapter (2.1), physis takes 
on a wide range of meanings in Plato and Aristotle.  Hence one cannot assume the term 
always conveys ideas of transcendence and hierarchy, particularly in a legal context in 
which nomos is the central concept.  As I will show later in this chapter, to attribute to 
Aristotle the view of physis as the source of certain commands or laws we may or may 
not obey is to fundamentally misunderstand his beliefs about the practical value of the 
knowledge of nature.  Moreover, he does not offer a hierarchical framework of law, one 
in which positive laws are just or unjust depending on their conformity to some higher or 
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transcendent law.  Part of the reason for this claim is that Aristotle nowhere advances the 
notion of obligation - essential to NLT
127
 - in his ethical and political thought; instead, he 
emphasizes the centrality of the human good which is attainable only by active 
participation in the political community.
128
  If these arguments are correct, then Leo 
Strauss' interpretation of Aristotle is preferable to that of Burns: what Aristotle calls 
natural justice (Strauss prefers to render the term as "natural right") is simply the set of 
principles or rights that must be adopted and enforced in any society that hopes to last 
and it is in this particular sense that the authority of such laws, e.g. the outlawing of 
murder and theft, is natural and universally recognized.
129
  On this view, Aristotle simply 
finds it strange to say that human societies decided that murder and theft should be 
outlawed.   The discovery or realization of such principles need not be tantamount to the 
discovery of natural law, but may only be a discovery of what an ideal rational agent or 
an ideally rational community would do if it hopes to thrive. 
 The fundamental distinction Aristotle draws in V.7, therefore, is not between 
natural law and positive law, but between laws with natural authority and are generally 
recognized in human societies (phusikon) and laws whose authority is entirely 
conventional and depend only on local preference (nomikon).  For the latter, Aristotle 
offers as an example the decision on whether the ransom for a prisoner will be one mina, 
or whether a goat should be sacrificed rather than two sheep.  The main point, as I 
understand him, is that nomikon contains no natural or objective basis for determining its 
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legislative content, and thus there is no relevant difference between sacrificing one goat 
and sacrificing two sheep (or, say, between driving on the right side of the road and 
driving on the left).  This point does not imply that such laws are unnecessary and 
dispensable.  Aristotle finds no inconsistency in asserting that nomikon is both 
conventional and necessary for society to thrive.  Aristotle's primary intention in 
distinguishing phusikon and nomikon, therefore, is to explain the necessary legal 
conditions under which a society might flourish.  While the natural law theorist would 
answer the same challenge using the distinction between natural law and positive law, 
Aristotle need not rely upon the same distinction.  It follows, then, that Burns' reading of 
phusikon and nomikon as natural law and positive law respectively requires additional 
evidence from Aristotle - evidence that, as far as I can tell, is lacking in the text. 
 In Rhetoric I.13 - perhaps the most oft-cited passage by scholars who consider 
Aristotle a natural law theorist - Aristotle distinguishes between "universal law" and 
"particular law."  The latter includes laws established by each culture in reference to itself 
and could be either written or unwritten.  The former refers to what Aristotle calls "the 
law of nature."
130
  To illustrate this distinction, he cites Antigone's decision to bury her 
brother Polynices: "when she says that the burial of Polynices was a just act in spite of 
the prohibition, she means that it was just by nature," that is, in accordance with some 
eternal and universal precept common to all societies.
131
  Aristotle adds a similar 
observation from Empedocles: "when he bids us kill no living creature, [Empedocles] 
says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others," but rather is "an 
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all-embracing law, through the realms of the sky," stretching unbroken over the entire 
earth.
132
   
 There is insufficient evidence, however, that Aristotle intends to erect a basic 
paradigm of moral and legal thought that he must defend against alternative views.  First, 
on the assumption that the primary purpose of the Rhetoric is to provide an account of the 
art of persuasion that would be most useful for a would-be lawyer or statesman, it would 
be surprising if Aristotle were to articulate and defend a new or controversial position in 
political theory in this context.  Second, just prior to establishing the distinction between 
universal and particular law, Aristotle makes clear that his purpose is to classify the 
commonly recognized types of law (and their applicability to differing classes of people).  
Thus, his intention does not appear to go beyond  reporting varieties of law and  their 
applications that are generally admitted and thus useful for forensic rhetoric.
133
  This 
explains why, after introducing the basic distinction between universal and particular law 
and providing examples, Aristotle says nothing to defend the validity of the distinction.  
Moreover, in his account of universal law (or the law of nature), he states that everyone 
recognizes that there is "a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on 
those who have no association or covenant with each other."
134
  Immediately following 
this claim, he provides examples from Sophocles, Empedocles, and Alcidamas to 
illustrate this particular understanding of universal law.  Therefore, if we are to regard 
Aristotle as a natural law theorist based on this passage, then we are forced to accept the 
problematic claim that the position of natural law, at least from Aristotle's point of view, 
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is universally accepted and thus not a distinct position within moral and legal 
philosophy.
135
   
  One may argue, however, that even if the two aforementioned passages do not in 
themselves justify a natural law reading of Aristotle, we might find the needed support by 
casting a broader net and taking into account his moral thought as a whole.  After all, 
Aristotle in the NE understands ethics as the effort to fulfill or realize some underlying 
human nature with a natural function or purpose (ergon).  Thus, ethics for Aristotle must 
presuppose, as Alasdair MacIntyre indicates, "some account of potentiality and act, some 
account of the essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the 
human telos."
136
  Would not a teleological moral theory grounded in an account of human 
nature, such as the one Aristotle provides, count as some form of natural law?  I attempt 
to answer this question in what follows. 
 
3.2 The Two Senses of Theōria 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that Aristotle's understanding of 
contemplative activity (theōria) provides the key clue for how we should respond to the 
foregoing question.  In Aristotle's general scheme of virtue according to the two 
characteristic activities of the human soul, reason and action, he describes theōria as the 
most excellent and worthy activity possible for a human being because it is virtuous 
activity according to the "best element" of the human soul, namely, the intellect.
137
  But 
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Aristotle adds a key point, seemingly to ground his claim regarding the supremacy of the 
intellect in the human soul: unlike the moral virtue (or virtue of action) which is 
characteristically human activity, theōria is the characteristic activity of the gods.  Based 
on this point, Aristotle concludes that a life of contemplation "is superior to one that is 
simply human, because someone lives thus, not in so far as he is a human being, but in so 
far as there is some divine element within him...If the intellect, then, is something divine 
compared with the human being, the life in accordance with it will also be divine 
compared with human life."
138
  If the life of the gods is supremely excellent, which 
Aristotle assumes to be true, then it appears that a life that fully approximates divine 
activity is the most excellent and blessed form of life possible.   
 However, Aristotle's "argument from divinity" in defense of the thesis that more 
contemplation is always preferable to less (which I discuss in 3.3) raises a key 
interpretive problem in the Nicomachean Ethics regarding Aristotle's final view of 
happiness (eudaimonia).
139
  Although Aristotle spends a great deal of time in the text 
clarifying and defending the life of comprehensive practical virtue, it is not entirely clear 
whether and how such a life could be compatible with one devoted mainly to theōria.  
For instance, he says in NE I.9-10 that "happiness requires complete virtue and a 
complete life," and thus the happy person "will spend all, or most, of his time engaged in 
action and contemplation in accordance with virtue."
140
  This passage seems to suggest 
that ideal happiness requires more than what theōria can offer.  Along similar lines, 
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Aristotle says of friendship that it "is an absolute necessity in life.  No one would choose 
to live without friends, even if he had all the other goods."
141
  These and other passages 
suggest what has been called the "expanded account" of eudaimonia: happiness in its 
ideal sense consists in nothing less than the full and harmonious exercise of both practical 
and intellectual virtue.
142
  However, elsewhere Aristotle asserts that "we ought not to 
listen to those who exhort us, because we are human, to think of human things, or 
because we are mortal, to think of mortal things.  We ought rather to take on immortality 
as much as possible, and do all that we can to live in accordance with the highest element 
within us; for even if its bulk is small, in its power and value it far exceeds 
everything."
143
  Rather than a life of complete practical and intellectual virtue, then, in 
this passage Aristotle appears to affirm a "restricted account" of eudaimonia: ideal 
happiness consists in the exclusive and maximal exercise of intellectual virtue in 
contemplative activity and that no other good is necessary.   
 I will attempt to show, first, that Aristotle accepts and defends the restricted 
account of eudaimonia, and, second, that Aristotle's defense of the restricted account is 
directly relevant to the question of natural law in his thought.  Specifically, I argue that if 
Aristotle accepts the restricted account of happiness, then he cannot also accept some 
form of natural law.  In order to show why Aristotle holds the restricted position, I give 
some attention to work Aristotle does in NE VI.1-7 which he later applies to a critical 
passage in X.8.  In the latter passage, Aristotle states that the life of practical virtue "is 
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happy in a secondary way, since the activities in accordance with it are human."  
Although it appears that Aristotle champions the life of theōria over the life of practical 
arete, advocates of the expanded account are quick and correct to point out that such an 
interpretation depends upon a key assumption about theōria, namely, that it is a very 
specific kind of intellectual activity with only very specific objects that do not include 
aspects of specifically human importance.  This assumption is problematic because 
Aristotle does not always use theōria in this narrow way.  In fact, he uses the term to 
cover a wide variety of contexts such that, as Kraut observes, "One can be said to be 
engaged in theōria whenever one closely observes or studies something - whatever that 
something is."
144
  Thus, on the expanded account, Aristotle's philosopher is the expert in 
both scientific and moral matters because both contain objects of contemplation that he 
has mastered, that is, objects that are necessary, unchanging, self-contained, and noble.
145
  
Although the typical objects of contemplation involve the gods and the heavens and 
perhaps mathematical objects, they are not limited to "otherworldly" considerations.
146
  
Moreover, the philosopher's expertise does not concern two disconnected realms but 
rather is a synthesized and organic whole.  Thus, on the expanded account theōria 
complements and completes practical wisdom, which implies that theōria is relevant to 
and useful for practical purposes.
 
   
 However, Kraut goes on to assert that "the theōria Aristotle is talking about in 
X.7-8 is not the study of just any objects or truths.  It is the activation of theoretical 
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wisdom, and this state of mind does not take human happiness as an object of 
study...When he uses theōria in this narrow way, he contrasts it with practical activity 
and practical thought."
147
  If Kraut's  reading is correct (as I believe it is), one must show 
that (1) while Aristotle uses theōria as a general and non-technical term to refer to the 
study of just about anything, he also develops in NE VI.1-7 a narrower and technical 
meaning for the term that sets it in contrast to practical reflection and activity, and (2) 
Aristotle applies the narrow understanding in his defense of the ideal contemplative life 
in X.7-8.  In support of (1), I turn now to NE VI.1-7.  I will defend (2) in the next section 
(3.3). 
 Aristotle's primary purpose in Book VI, as he states, is to identify the virtues of 
thought or reason in contrast to the virtues of character (which he has discussed in Books 
II-V).
148
  Moreover, just as the soul consists of two parts, "one with reason and the other 
without," so too does the rational element consist of two parts: the calculative and the 
scientific.  When Aristotle first describes the activity characteristic of the two sub-parts of 
reason, he uses theōria for both: "one [part] with which we contemplate those things 
whose first principles cannot be otherwise, and another those things whose first principles 
can be otherwise."
149
  Leaving aside for now what he means by "first principles" in this 
context, the important point to notice is that theōria is involved in calculating or 
deliberating (Aristotle equates the two latter terms explicitly) as well as in scientific 
reasoning.
150
  Here, then, we find the broad sense of theōria: intellectual activity that 
ranges over any number of topics, including practical considerations oriented toward how 
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one should act.  This broad sense is what Aristotle has in mind when he discusses 
practically wise people in NE VI.5: "We may grasp what practical wisdom is by 
considering the sort of people we describe as practically wise.  It seems to be 
characteristic of the practically wise person to be able to deliberate nobly about what is 
good and beneficial for himself, not in particular respects, such as what conduces to 
health or strength, but about what conduces to living well as a whole.”151  We should note 
that Aristotle is using, not mentioning, the term “deliberation,” which he developed back 
in NE III.2-3 as a thesis on the meaning of rational choice (prohairesis).  Deliberation has 
an essentially practical meaning such that the term cannot simply be applied to an 
unspecified range of possible objects.  According to Aristotle, “No one deliberates about 
eternal things,” by which he means that deliberation is always about things that could be 
otherwise and never about things that are permanent and unchanging, i.e., the first 
principles of the universe.
152
   
 We should now see that while theōria (as Aristotle has used the term thus far) 
ranges over a wide range of objects of thought, Aristotle also insists upon a fundamental 
and critical distinction among those objects - a distinction between objects that are 
properly scientific and objects that are properly practical.  The foregoing distinction 
implies that the objects of practical reason are limited to those in the moral agent's power 
to bring about.
153
  In other words, an essential component to practical rationality is that it 
must be oriented to action in accordance with the moral virtues.
 
 Hence in Book I 




 III. 3. 1112a. 
153
 To say that the objects of practical reason are limited, however, I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle 
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Aristotle states that the purpose of his lectures on morality “is not knowledge but action.”  
One should not be surprised, then, that in NE VI.2 Aristotle offers the following 
statement on practical thought: 
Such thought governs productive thought as well, in that everyone who produces 
aims at some goal, and the product is not the goal without qualification, but only 
relative to something, and instrumental to something; for the goal without 





Virtuous action itself is the goal of practical rationality, and the latter is necessary for the 
former.  Indeed, we are not in fact “acting” (in the proper sense of the term) if the action 
does not proceed from deliberation and choice.  However, in stark contrast to practical 
reasoning, scientific thought "moves nothing" because its aim is not practical, that is, not 
oriented toward right action (praxis).
154
  Aristotle states in VI.5,  
No one deliberates about what cannot be otherwise, or about things he cannot do.  
So, if scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration 
of anything whose first principles can be otherwise, and if one cannot deliberate 




Thus, theōria as deliberation about how to live well (VI.5) is an activity of reason that is 
different in kind from theōria as the pursuit of scientific knowledge.  In Metaphysics VI.1 
for example, we find Aristotle's hierarchical arrangement of what may be called the 
"higher sciences" of theology, physics, and mathematics (in descending order), which 
closely follows Plato's own arrangement in the Republic.  Aristotle points out that this 
arrangement is based on the primary purpose of theoretical inquiry: "We are seeking the 
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principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being."
156
  In 
the same section, Aristotle sets the study of what is in contrast to practical thought: 
"Therefore, if all thought is either practical or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical 
science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about 
substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter."
157
  Note here 
that although we might allow for the contemplation of moral ideas or other aspects of 
human happiness based on the NE, Aristotle explicitly excludes such considerations in 
his account of theōria in Metaphysics VI.1.   This exclusion suggests two key points:  
First, Aristotle does not always have the broad sense of theōria in mind, and the 
aforementioned passage in the Metaphysics appears to be one of those passages.  It is 
plausible, then, that in his work on theōria in NE VI Aristotle presupposes that his 
audience is already adequately familiar with the narrower meaning of the term and thus 
will not be surprised to find him making use of different senses of theōria here.  Second, 
the theoretical philosopher, insofar as his expertise is limited to scientific inquiry, is not 
an expert in human and practical affairs.
158
  In other words, ideal theoretical activity - or 
metaphysics in the strict sense
159
 - excludes the truths of  the lower sciences, includes 




 This background allows us to appreciate the fundamental importance of 
Aristotle’s claim in NE VI.2: 
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 I defend this point later in this chapter.   
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 In the case of thought concerned with theōria, however, which is neither practical 
 nor productive, what constitute its being good and bad are truth and falsity, 
 because truth is the characteristic activity of everything concerned with thought.  
 But in the case of what is practical and concerned with thought, its being good 
 consists in truth in agreement with correct desire. 
 
Clearly Aristotle does not have the broad sense of theōria in mind here.  He is, rather, 
introducing the narrower technical meaning of the term.  The theōria Aristotle develops 
here consists in the study of the first principles of nature (physis) or "what is" which 
defines the higher sciences.  Specifically, he has in mind the study of eternal, necessary, 
and unchanging realities that characterized pre-Socratic philosophy and is specifically 
treated in NE VI.3 and 6.  In these sections Aristotle twice refers to the Analytics (by 
which he most likely means the Posterior Analytics) where he argues that because 
scientific knowledge "is something which cannot be other than it is," it is the kind of 
knowledge that comes by demonstration resting upon first principles.
161
  In these 
references Aristotle again assumes that his audience is sufficiently acquainted with his 
teachings on logic and the sciences to grasp the kind of knowledge he has in mind.  For 
this reason, Aristotle can assert without much argument that philosophers such as Thales 
and Anaxagoras “are [theoretically] wise, but not practically wise, when they are seen to 
be ignorant of what is in their own interest; and that their knowledge is extraordinary, 
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3.3 The Argument from Divinity in NE X.7-8 
 Assuming my interpretation of Aristotle thus far is sound, I have shown only that 
at one point in the NE Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of theōria.  In the broad 
sense of the term contemplation may include matters of practical reason - that is, 
considerations of how one should to act in any given situation.  In the narrower and 
technical sense contemplation is defined in contrast to practical reasoning and thus 
includes neither deliberation nor rational choice.
163
   
 What remains unclear is whether Aristotle identifies the distinguishing activity of 
the philosopher with the narrow meaning of theōria.  Those who defend the expanded 
account of eudaimonia in Aristotle may grant the distinction between the broad and 
narrow senses of theōria as developed in Book VI and still assert that the contemplative 
activity proper to the philosopher - especially the ideal philosopher of NE X.7-8 who 
enjoys the most perfect happiness - need not be limited to the narrow sense.
164
  On this 
reading the philosopher who is entirely devoted to metaphysical topics, even if these 
topics are the most excellent and noble ones (as Aristotle assumes), is not the ideal 
philosopher according to Aristotle because he lacks something essential to complete 
happiness, namely, a comprehensive practical life that involves, or even centers on, the 
contemplation of both divine and human objects.  We find an example of the foregoing 
expanded position in Amélie O. Rorty's essay, "The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's 
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Nicomachean Ethics,"  where she argues that for Aristotle “contemplating Humanity is 
not only a good thing but the best and indeed the most pleasant component of the fully 
happy life.”165  Her point rests upon the claim that for Aristotle a human being is a 
"contemplative person," essentially a "Mind," and as such the contemplation of ourselves 
means the contemplation of an object that is among the finest and noblest objects that 
exist.
166
  The point is important because for Aristotle the relation between the 
contemplator and the object of contemplation is dynamic and transformative rather than 
static and passive.  The thinker becomes identical with the formal character of the given 
object of thought.
167
    Thus, to contemplate Humanity we not only contemplate an object 
that is among the finest and most perfect, but we are also transformed by the formal 
characteristics of this object and become like it - that is, we become, as Rorty concludes, 
“a unified whole, a self-contained, self-justified, and fully actualized human being."168   
 Although Rorty registers an important insight here with respect to the 
transformative quality of contemplative activity, she does not demonstrate how the 
argument is compatible with passages in which Aristotle appears to directly reject her 
thesis.  In NE VI. 7, for instance, Aristotle states that  
 It would be absurd for someone to think that political science or practical wisdom 
 is the best science, unless human beings are the best thing in the cosmos...It 
 makes no difference if it is claimed that a human being is superior to all the other 
 animals.  For there are other things far more divine in nature than human beings, 
 such as - to take the most obvious example - the things constituting the cosmos. 
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 Aristotle states in De Anima, "Mind is itself thinkable in  exactly the same way as its objects.  For in the 
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That humanity, at least in this passage, is not among the finest things to think about 
reveals a possible confusion in Rorty’s notion of “Humanity."  It should be obvious that 
what Aristotle means by “human being” in VI. 7 cannot be the same as what Rorty means 
by “Humanity” because, on Rorty's account, to contemplate Humanity is to contemplate 
the human being insofar as the human being possesses a divine rational element.  If she 
intends to include the contemplation of  human beings as members of a polis with 
practical concerns and a definite material nature, then one has difficulty seeing how the 
contemplation of Humanity in that sense could be, on Aristotle's view, among the noblest 
things to think about.  In short, Rorty appears to imply that contemplating Humanity 
would be in essence the same as contemplating the gods.  But, again, that does not appear 
to be Aristotle's view.  Indeed, in NE X.7 he cautions us against confusing the human 
with the divine:     
But we ought not to listen to those who exhort us, because we are human, to think 
of human things, or because we are mortal, to think of mortal things.  We ought 
rather to take on immortality as much as possible, and do all that we can to live in 




Aristotle's point is that the rational part of the human soul capable of engaging in theōria 
(in the narrow sense) is not a human element but rather a divine one.  Just prior to the 
foregoing passage, he states, "Such a life [of theōria] is superior to one that is simply 
human, because someone lives thus, not in so far as he is a human being, but in so far as 
there is some divine element within him."
169
  Thus, to consider the contemplation of that 
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element as tantamount to the contemplation of Humanity involves an error in how we 
understand Aristotle's view of the human person.   
 What still must be shown from NE X.7-8 is that the characteristic activity of 
Aristotle's ideal (and ideally happy) philosopher is limited to theōria in the narrow sense.  
Even if the foregoing critique of Rorty's position is correct and humanity is not among 
the best objects that the ideal philosopher might contemplate, it does not follow that the 
philosopher can do without thinking about the lower or "worldly" things if he is to live an 
ideally happy life.  Rather than perceiving that the philosopher's happiness is somehow 
compromised to the extent that he contemplates the lower objects, perhaps we should 
read Aristotle as saying that the philosopher's happiness is compromised (or incomplete) 
to the extent that he fails to contemplate all that is worth contemplating in the heavens 
and on earth.     
 If we accept the foregoing expanded reading of Aristotle, however, we will not be 
able to make sense of a key argument Aristotle offers on behalf of perfect happiness.  In 
several places in NE X.8 Aristotle makes the point that the gods enjoy supreme happiness 
and, thus, divine activity is the archetype for eudaimonia in its ideal form.  This point is 
the basis for Arisotle's "argument from divinity," which we may summarize as follows: 
because the gods are the happiest of all living beings, and because their happiness is the 
direct result of theōria, any living being will enjoy happiness to the extent that it is able 
to contemplate as the gods contemplate.  Aristotle states, "So the god's activity, which is 
superior in blessedness, will be contemplative; and therefore the human activity most 
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akin to this is the most conducive to happiness."
170
  Almost immediately following this 
passage, he reiterates the argument: "the life of the gods is entirely blessed, and that of 
human beings is so to the extent that it contains something like this sort of 
activity...Happiness, then, extends as far as contemplation, and the more contemplation 
there is in one's life, the happier one is."
171
   
 But what sort of theōria does Aristotle have in mind here?  That is, what sorts of 
objects are the focus of the kind of theōria that characterizes divine activity?  To answer 
this question we must attend to the following key passage: 
 That complete happiness consists in some contemplative activity is also apparent 
 from the following.  We assume the gods to be supremely blessed and happy; 
 but what sorts of actions should we attribute to them?  Just actions?  But will they 
 not obviously be ridiculous if they make contracts, return deposits and so on?  
 Courageous acts, then, enduring what is fearful and facing dangers because it is 
 noble to do so?  Or generous  acts?  To whom will they give?  And it will be 
 absurd if they have money or anything like it.  And what would their temperate 
 acts consist in?  Is such praise not cheap, since they have no bad appetites?  If we 
 were to run through them all, anything to do with actions would appear petty and 
 unworthy of the gods.
172
 
Certainly, one key point Aristotle makes is that the gods are asocial and amoral.  They do 
not perform any of the typical actions (e.g., making contracts) or exhibit any of the 
specific (moral) virtues that constitute life in the polis.  In light of this point, however, we 
are right to wonder how divine activity could possibly be ideal for human happiness, 
assuming that we are social and political animals.  I will attend to this question shortly, 
but we should not miss a key point Aristotle is making here: he is not simply concerned 
with arguing that a life free of social and moral considerations is happiest (a point he 
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suggests elsewhere
173
), but he also wants to emphasize the kind of contemplation that is 
characteristic of ideal happiness.  He states at the outset of the passage that "complete 
happiness consists in some contemplative activity," by which I read him to mean some 
particular type of theōria as opposed to theōria in addition to other activities.  That it 
cannot mean the latter should be obvious from the passage itself: Aristotle explicitly 
eliminates social and moral activity from the picture of perfect happiness.  Thus, 
Aristotle's emphasis on the amoral and asocial life of the gods also serves to define the 
kind of theōria Aristotle has in mind, one that is free of moral and social objects, i.e. the 
narrow and technical sense of the term.
174
  Aristotle regards as obvious the point that the 
kind of contemplative activity that the perfectly happy individual exercises is theoretical 
(or metaphysical) activity in its purest form.  If this interpretation is correct, then a 
presupposition of Aristotle's which is vital for our purposes is that metaphysics is non-
normative, which is to say, the study of nature does not afford the theoretical philosopher 
(or the gods) access to specifically moral truths and principles.  I will return to this point 
in the next section (3.4).   
 Before leaving NE X.7-8, I should address an aforementioned problem in the 
argument from divinity.  Even if we grant that the gods' only occupation is 
contemplation, and that they enjoy perfect happiness as a result of this activity, we are 
right to ask how this could possibly serve as an account of specifically human happiness.  
What reason do we have for thinking that we stand to gain from engaging in theōria, and 
that the more we do so the better off we are?  Moreover, it is puzzling why Aristotle 
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would make this argument when it appears to be in direct conflict with the account of 
eudaimonia he articulates in earlier books in the NE and elsewhere.  Previously in the NE 
(in Book I), Aristotle defended what Michael J. White calls a "functionalistic conception" 
of human happiness: the suggestion that human well-being depends upon our ability to 
fulfill or realize some natural underlying human purpose or function (ergon, which 
literally means "work").
175
  In I.7 for instance, Aristotle states that we can understand 
what the human good is "if we grasp the characteristic activity (ergon) of a human being.  
For just as the good - the doing well - of a flute player, a sculptor or any practitioner of a 
skill...is  thought to lie in its characteristic activity, so the same would seem to be true of 
a human being, if indeed he has a characteristic activity."  This account of eudaimonia is 
species-specific: the type of activity that will yield eudaimonia depends upon the species 
in question.  Thus, the activity that will yield human eudaimonia is not the same as the 
activity that will yield the eudaimonia of some other being.  But the argument from 
divinity quite obviously depends upon a species-independent understanding of happiness: 
there exists a supremely excellent activity such that any being capable of engaging in that 
activity will be happy to the extent that it engages in it.  Hence, theōria is the best activity 
possible for a human being, not because it is most suitable to human nature, but because 
it possesses qualities, e.g. permanence and stability, that are themselves intrinsically, 
objectively, and supremely good.   
 In response to this occasional Platonizing tendency in Aristotle, which appears 
inconsistent with his ethical thinking taken as a whole, some scholars have simply 
rejected the argument from divinity as representative of Aristotle's mature moral and 
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political perspective.
176
  In the final analysis, they maintain, the only plausible 
interpretation of Aristotle is that he accepts and defends the view that theōria must be 
suitable to the kind of activity that a human being of practical excellence with the 
necessary leisure would do, for he does this as an activity that completes his happy life.
177
  
Contemplative activity is indeed the finest activity possible for a human being, but, as 
Nussbaum notes, it "is, as it were, the biggest and brightest jewel in a crown full of 
valuable jewels."
178
 Whatever we might say about this ideal life of theōria, it must be an 
inherently and unavoidably human endeavor, with all the practical and social implications 
that being human entails.  In other words, the life of theoretical activity cannot be 
separated from the life of practical virtue: “the fully happy life for man, as Aristotle 
understands it in the Nicomachean Ethics, is a life of practical virtue crowned by 
theoretic activity.”179  Otherwise, Aristotle's eudaimonism suffers from a fatal 
contradiction between species-specific and species-independent conceptions of 
happiness.  Thus, if the restricted account of eudaimonia that I have sought to defend is to 
be preserved, it appears we must provide some account that reconciles this apparent 
contradiction. 
 Providing an account of all the relevant passages or to deal with all the arguments 
raised on each side of the issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.  But I do think we can 
sketch a position, one that is fair to Aristotle, which does not require us to dismiss NE 
X.7-8 from his broader moral theory on the grounds that it contradicts what he says 
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elsewhere.  First, then, one must ask whether Aristotle's defense of the functionalistic 
(species-specific) model of happiness in Book I of the NE somehow commits him to the 
view that certain activities are excellent and praiseworthy only if they are suitable to the 
particular ergon of the being in question.  On this reading, Aristotle praises intellectual 
and moral virtue only because they are inherently human activities conducive to human 
well-being; moreover, if Aristotle also thought that these activities possess certain 
intrinsic noble qualities that are praiseworthy regardless of the being or creature that 
performs them, he is committing an obvious contradiction.  There may yet be a 
contradiction in the juxtaposition of these theses, but it is hardly an obvious one.  For it 
seems possible that the distinctively human activities which define human aretai just 
happen to be among the finest and noblest activities possible for any being to perform.  
Hence one might read Aristotle as grounding the human aretai in nature (physis) in two 
senses: in the qualified sense, virtue amounts to being excellent at the things that a human 
being does by nature; and, in the unqualified sense, virtue is the exercise of those 
activities that possess intrinsic excellence and worthiness.
180
   
 One obvious objection to the foregoing account is that Aristotle's endorsement of 
the exclusive exercise of theōria does not align with his argument that such goods as 
friendship are necessary for human happiness.
181
  In other words, Aristotle clearly 
defends an understanding of eudaimonia that is a composite of various activities, theōria 
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being only one of them.
182
  In NE VI.12, for example, he states that "sophia produces 
happiness...by being a part of virtue as a whole."   Nussbaum takes this passage to mean 
that contemplative activity is not merely "a productive means toward eudaimonia, but an 
actual part of it; but Aristotle also makes clear that it is a part and not the whole."
183
   
 This reading of Aristotle is problematic, however.  First, one correctly questions 
whether, in NE VI.12, Aristotle means by sophia contemplative wisdom in particular.  He 
frequently uses sophia to refer to practical rather than theoretical wisdom.  Indeed, the 
passage in question is a case in point: in the sentences just prior to the one Nussbaum 
notes, Aristotle uses sophia to speak of both practical and theoretical wisdom, suggesting 
that he does not intend a technical meaning of sophia that would isolate contemplative 
wisdom in distinction to other forms of sophia.  Second, even if we grant the Nussbaum 
reading, it is not obvious that Aristotle's claim should cause difficulty for him to assert 
later on that ideal happiness consists in the exclusive exercise of theōria.  Aristotle's 
argument for ideal happiness rests upon the thesis, which he introduces in NE I.5 and 
defends in X.8, that there are in fact two models of eudaimonia, and that the ideal form 
realized in constant theoretical activity  is hardly possible for any human being to 
achieve, though a very few may come close, e.g. Thales.  This thesis is critical for how 
we interpret Aristotle's earlier claims regarding eudaimonia, for it may be that when he 
claims friendship and contemplation (among other things) are composite parts of 
happiness, he has only the secondary form of happiness in mind.  Indeed, one has no 
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reason to suppose that theōria does not have a role in the happiness derived from the 
political life.  On this reading, one simply understands Aristotle as attempting to be 
realistic: while a fortunate few might manage a purely philosophical life (insofar as such 
a life is possible for a human  being to achieve), the great majority would do well to set 
their sights on the lesser though highly attractive form of happiness; and, if one is able to 
enjoy that form of happiness, then one will most certainly need friends along with the 
other goods of political life (including theōria).184  If Aristotle's likely audience - that is, 
pupils, most of whom are preparing for careers in politics or law - should play any role in 
this interpretation, then my suggested reading appears all the more plausible.   
 Third, the interpretation which regards theōria as the best part of a completely 
happy life appears to overlook Aristotle's use of the term "complete (teleia) happiness."  
"Complete happiness" appears only three times in the NE and all three occur in X.7-8.  
With the first occurrence (1177a), Aristotle introduces a key principle for ranking greater 
and lesser forms of eudaimonia: if happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, then 
the best kind of happiness - or "complete happiness" - is activity in accordance with the 
virtue of the best element of the human soul.  Aristotle uses the term a second time 
following several arguments on behalf of the superiority of theōria (in the narrow sense).  
He concludes by saying in 1177b, "Thus [theōria] will be complete happiness for a 
human being - if it consumes a complete span of life, because there is nothing incomplete 
in matters of happiness."  In the sentence immediately following, Aristotle says, "[s]uch a 
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life is superior to one that is simply human, because someone lives thus, not in so far as 
he is a human being, but in so far as there is some divine element within him."  The 
reason why this additional point is important for our purposes is hard to miss: the life of 
complete happiness is not a complete human life crowned by philosophical activity, but 
rather a life consisting in the exclusive exercise of theōria.  The final use of the term 
appears at the outset of his argument from divinity in which Aristotle eliminates, as we 
have seen, practical virtue from the picture of complete happiness.  His main point, 
apparently, is this: just as the gods enjoy complete happiness without the exercise of 
practical virtue, the same must be true for human beings, who also are capable of 
engaging in that way of life.   
 
3.4  The Ideal Philosopher and Natural Right 
 I have offered the foregoing interpretation in order to provide some account for 
why Aristotle never develops a position of natural law, even though he might prima facie 
have some reason to develop a moral and political theory along those lines.  After all, 
Aristotle's primary intention in his ethical works is to provide some account of human 
virtue and goodness grounded in nature (physis) rather than convention (nomos).  He 
argues that human goodness and virtue is about developing and perfecting the natural 
human ergon in both its moral and political senses.  It would be difficult to deny, I think, 
that in some general sense these commitments are suggest a doctrine of natural law in 
Aristotle.  Moreover, it is important but ultimately insufficient to say that, because of the 
nomos-physis distinction, Aristotle, for that reason alone, never spoke of "natural law" 
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and could not have supported some version of natural law theory.  I have attempted to 
show in 2.1 that the nomos-physis contrast, though central to understanding the respective 
moral theories of Plato and Aristotle, is not a complete antithesis and thus need not 
convey the sharp contradiction that Leo Strauss suggests.  Thus, I have attempted to 
provide a more developed account of Aristotle's ethics in order to answer the question of 
why he does not use the term "natural law" or advocate a natural law theory.  To 
conclude the present chapter, I show that my reading of Aristotle adequately answers this 
question. 
 I have argued that the restricted account represents the best and fairest way to 
understand the place of theōria in Aristotle's eudaimonistic moral theory as he develops it 
in the NE.
185
  The value of this particular focus on Aristotle is that it affords us the best 
opportunity, if such an opportunity exists, to demonstrate natural law in his thinking.  
Even if we were to take his Politics into explicit consideration, we would be forced to 
return to the question of eudaimonia, for Aristotle's argument for the naturalness of the 
polis (or the state) and of the political aretai, which is to say that both of these things do 
not exist merely by convention (nomos), derives from his account of human nature and 
the conditions that are required for human flourishing.
186
  As we have seen, the happiness 
of the philosopher consists of the particular activity that characterizes his entire life; and, 
as I have argued, that activity is theōria in the narrow sense of the term.  Thus, my 
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account of Aristotle, if correct, has accomplished the following: first, Aristotle limits the 
expertise of the ideal philosopher to metaphysics, that is, the higher sciences according to 
Metaphysics VI.1; and, second, Aristotle defines metaphysical study (or the study of 
physis) so as to exclude anthropology and biology as well as moral and political 
reflection (the latter because they are not oriented to action).
187
  If these two points are 
correct, then it follows that mastery of the higher sciences does not afford the philosopher 
with specifically moral truths and principles.  In other words, metaphysical truths are not, 
at the same time, normative truths as well.  Consequently, metaphysical truths could not 
be considered as commands of nature or practical requirements of reason that human 
beings are bound to obey.    
 Further, to develop the foregoing point, let us consider more carefully Aristotle's 
ideal philosopher and whether his particular theoretical expertise is of any value to the 
proper and virtuous governance of himself and his polis.  In NE VI.7 Aristotle argues that 
the most excellent form of wisdom (sophia) is scientific or theoretical wisdom; and, 
consequently, people regard Anaxagoras and Thales as wise even though they are not 
"practically wise."  Part of Aristotle's point is to defend theoretical sophia as a legitimate 
form of wisdom and thus that Thales and other natural philosophers are correctly 
considered to be wise.  But Aristotle also argues that the theoretical sophia of Thales 
taken in isolation disqualifies him from possessing any insight or expertise in moral 
matters.  Aristotle makes the point quite emphatically, in fact: "their knowledge is 
extraordinary, wonderful, abstruse, godlike, but useless, because it is not human goods 
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they are looking for."
188
  If theoretical sophia occupies no part in practical sophia - a 
point Aristotle makes explicit in NE VI.8 - the ideal philosopher who possesses only 
theoretical sophia cannot by definition possess practical sophia.  As a result, his 
particular wisdom would be of no use to his city - indeed, it would be of no use to himself 
insofar as it concerns the practical demands of life in the polis.   
 Sarah Broadie has rejected the foregoing analysis on grounds that we would be 
attributing to Aristotle the obviously unattractive position that separates all moral and 
practical concerns from theoretical inquiry.  She asserts that "[o]nce that ethical 
connection is broken and theoretic activity is allowed out entirely on its own 
recognizance, what entitles it to more consideration than any eccentric hobby?"
189
  
Broadie's position is sensible, especially if we are to take seriously the apparent model of 
philosophic activity presented in Plato's writings.  Socrates' primary commitment, it 
would seem, is to reject the notion of philosophy as a purely ethereal practice and to 
defend its vital relevance for the daily concerns of human beings living in a sociopolitical 
context.  Philosophy would do Euthyphro some good, for instance, if only to protect him 
from forming (and acting upon) rash opinions about such things as piety.   
 In response, I have already offered reasons why it may be problematic to assume 
that Plato was committed to the practical or social value of philosophic activity (see 2.3).  
In addition, Broadie's description of theōria, narrowly understood, as one eccentric hobby 
among others is surely questionable given how often Aristotle emphasizes the superiority 
of contemplative activity.  Granted, Broadie's point may be that theōria is a fine thing for 
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the gods to do, but human beings in the full flesh and blood sense of the term have other 
things to worry about.  Thus, insofar as the regular demands of ordinary human life 
supplies the context for thinking about the value of theōria, the life of contemplation to 
the exclusion of everything else cannot be admirable - for us or for Aristotle.  But this 
way of reading Aristotle is unacceptable if the foregoing arguments I have offered are 
sound.  According to the interpretation of Aristotle I have been defending, the value of  
theōria is unqualified, that is, it remains the best activity possible for human beings 
regardless of the particular political context within which one lives.  As we have seen, 
Aristotle's position seems to be that any being capable of contemplative activity will 
enjoy optimal happiness to the extent that the being can engage in that activity.  The fact 
that such a person would be useless to his city, at least insofar as his theoretic sophia is 
concerned, seems not to bother Aristotle.  Philosophers need not "explain themselves” – 
that is, justify their existence as philosophers – to their respective lawmakers, as though 
the value of activity depends upon its potential benefit to the city.  For Aristotle, the polis 
provides the necessary context for human beings fully to realize the latent potentialities 
of human nature, potentialities that include the exercise of theoretical philosophy.  Thus, 
it is unsurprising that Aristotle does not express qualms regarding citizens who have been 
fortunate (and virtuous) enough to engage actively in theōria and, as a result, do 
relatively little to benefit their respective polis.
190
      
 One should ask, however, whether it is possible for a less-than-ideal philosopher, 
one who practices a lower form of theōria (or theōria in the broad sense), to afford us 
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knowledge of those natural moral principles that human beings should accept?
191
  If so, 
might that provide some basis for natural law in Aristotle?  The question is fair.  As we 
have seen, Aristotle does not include human beings among the finest things that the ideal 
philosopher would contemplate.
192
  If there are any natural moral principles based on the 
human physis, then, the ideal philosopher would apprehend none of them because he 
never studies human nature.  But a lesser philosopher who does study the human physis 
would presumably grasp the functionalistic conception of ethics that Aristotle defends in 
Book I of the NE.  Such a philosopher would understand the importance of a developed 
"normative anthropology," that is, an account of human nature that simultaneously 
explains how human beings should to live.
193
  Would such a philosopher be best 
equipped to present and defend a conception of natural law?    
 Such an attempt is problematic, however, because nothing in Aristotle's 
conception of theōria in the broad sense (which would include the study of human nature 
and the polis) commits him to a natural law position in particular.  For Aristotle (and 
Plato before him), contemplation in the broad sense involves the study of the best form or 
state of a thing, whatever that thing might be.  Thus, the doctor contemplates the human 
body, which is to say that the doctor studies the best form of the human body, i.e. the 
state in which the body is healthiest.  The statesman contemplates human nature and the 
polis (the discipline Aristotle calls "political science" in NE I.1)  and considers under 
what conditions the polis is in its best and healthiest state.  But the concern of the 
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statesman here is that of natural right rather than natural law.  His primary aim, in other 
words, is to discern what must be recognized by any political society if that society is 
going to thrive.  In commenting on Aristotle, Leo Strauss makes the correct observation: 
"natural right [which Aristotle holds] is that right which must be recognized by any 
political society if it is to last and which for this reason is everywhere in force.  Natural 
right thus understood delineates the minimum conditions of political life, so much so that 
sound positive right occupies a higher rank than natural right."
194
     
 One might reasonably object, however, that if Aristotle does accept and defend 
the position of natural right, then it is difficult to see how truths of nature (broadly 
construed) are non-normative, as I have previously argued.  Would not Aristotle's 
account of the parts of the soul (NE I.13), for instance, simultaneously contain 
anthropological and normative truths because, as Aristotle argues, a proper account of 
human nature is the necessary foundation for how we understand human happiness?  
According to this objection, it appears that for a scientific truth to count as normative it 
need only have normative or practical implications.  The truth, for instance, that the 
planets move asynchronously with the stars may not have any immediate or obvious 
practical relevance, at least not in the same way as the truth that man is a rational animal 
does.  Apparently, while the former truth would be scientific only, the latter would be 
both scientific and normative.   
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 The foregoing reading of Aristotle is certainly plausible, even attractive, if for no 
other reason than that it helps to account for Aristotle's emphasis on the place of science 
in moral inquiry.  Indeed, it would be difficult to understand Aristotle's moral theory 
apart from such a commitment on his part.  On the other hand, I have pointed out (3.2) 
that Aristotle also develops a narrower understanding of what counts as normative truth, 
one in which a normative truth – that is, a truth of practical wisdom – has virtuous action 
as its proper end (telos).
195
  When the individual of practical wisdom gives thought to 
how to live well, Aristotle uses the term deliberation rather than contemplation.
196
  He 
writes, "[p]ractical wisdom [in contrast to theoretical wisdom] is concerned with human 
affairs, namely, with what we can deliberate about."
197
  What does Aristotle mean?  I 
cannot provide a complete account of deliberation here, of course, but the task is easier if 
one keeps in mind that Aristotle has already treated deliberation as a technical term in NE 
III.3.  In that section, Aristotle argues that "[n]o one deliberates about eternal 
things...Rather, we deliberate about what is in our power, that is, what we can do."  That 
is, deliberation consists in the process of practical reasoning which aims at a conclusion 
that is essentially practical, e.g. "I should do x," or "It would  be best for me to do y."  
Although the practically wise person makes use of scientific truths, e.g. "Man is a rational 
animal," such statements in themselves cannot justify a practical conclusion apart from a 
practical principle or statement that is part of the premises.  Thus, the statement, "Man is 
a rational animal," is (strictly speaking) non-normative on Aristotle's view because it is 
not practically oriented in its content in the same way as the statement, "You should 
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study philosophy if you wish to be happy."  While the former represents a key piece of 
information for the practically wise person to employ in forming a practical plan of 
action, it is not in itself a normative truth because it says nothing about how one should to 
act.   
 If, however, we take normative truth in the aforementioned broad sense - that is, 
for a scientific truth to be normative, it need only have practical implications or be useful 
in practical argumentation in some way - then we could not, on that basis alone, justify a 
natural law reading of Aristotle as opposed to a natural right one.
198
  If we grant (as it is 
reasonable to do) that the premise, "Man is a rational animal," implies that one ought to 
be rational, the precise meaning of "ought" in this context is vague and does not 
necessarily imply moral obligation.
199
  Indeed, on Strauss' view the term could not imply 
some sort of command or obligation as notions connected with law because Aristotle 
never suggests as much.
200
  Rather, I suggest that we understand the term conditionally in 
the following way: one ought to be rational if one wishes to be happy.  That Aristotle 
already grants the antecedent, namely that everyone desires eudaimonia, does not, of 
course, undermine this interpretation of  Aristotle's imperative.  Indeed, if we accept the 
conditional reading, then Aristotle's assertion that all desire eudaimonia provides the 
basis for his argument on behalf of a particular conception of human flourishing.  
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Otherwise, there would be no obvious point in establishing that all desire eudaimonia and 
that the purpose of the NE is to investigate eudaimonia in its ideal form.   
 Understood in the conditional sense, then, the normative implications of scientific 
truths would only specify the conditions under which the optimal state of something 
could be achieved.  The objection that this analysis attributes to Aristotle an overly weak 
notion of the moral imperative, one that is hypothetical rather than categorical, fails for 
lack of evidence.  While it is tempting to read Aristotle's statement that it is a sacred duty 
to prefer the truth to one's friends in a Kantian light, it is not clear that he intends by this 
statement or similar ones a theoretical conception of imperative or obligation in the 
strong sense.  Aristotle makes the statement in passing, and at no point in his ethical 
writings  does he develop a theoretical concept of moral obligation.    
  As a final point, the foregoing attempt to base a natural law reading of Aristotle 
upon the study of the human physis presupposes a fundamental division between human 
beings and the cosmos.  Included in the presupposition is the claim that nothing among 
the eternal truths of physis affords human beings with insight as to how to live.  
Consequently, if human beings are to acquire such an understanding, then human beings 
must study themselves.  Leaving aside the problems that follow from regarding such a 
view as a theory of natural law, it is important to note that at the center of the 
development of Stoic natural law is the rejection of any fundamental bifurcation of man 
and nature.  As we shall see in the next chapter, the Stoics argued that a knowledge of 
nature provides us with a knowledge of ourselves - a principle contained in the critical 
concept of homologia.  
  90 
CHAPTER 4 
NATURE AS NORMATIVE: STOICISM AND THE BIRTH OF NATURAL LAW 
 
4.1  General Background 
 The explicit and widespread use of the term "natural law" (lex naturalis) to 
articulate and defend a distinct position in moral and legal theory occurs for the first time 
in the first century B.C. with the Stoics, particularly the Roman Stoics, and most clearly 
in the writings of Cicero.  As the previous chapters have shown, the term appears in 
Greek philosophical literature only occasionally and never as a technical term that 
represents a generally coherent and recognized set of philosophical commitments.  Until 
the Stoics, NLT per se had yet to exist.  This chapter provides an account of this 
development in ancient moral theory.  The foregoing chapters have defended an 
essentially negative thesis: Plato's and Aristotle's moral theories are not versions of 
natural law because neither philosopher developed a normative conception of nature, that 
is, a conception of nature as the source of moral obligations understood in terms of laws 
that human beings are obligated to obey.  If my interpretation of Plato and Aristotle is 
correct, then I will need to show that Stoic NLT was not simply an extension or 
byproduct of the received eudaimonist tradition, as Lloyd Weinreb has argued (1.2), but a 
significant reconstruction of it, one that required a fundamental rethinking of the tradition 
and, in particular, its understanding of nature in moral theory.  In the present chapter I 
argue that the development of Stoic NLT rested upon their formulation of a "theological 
conception" of nature, a conception that is best understood as a response to the Epicurean 
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challenge to traditional eudaimonism.
201
  On this view, natural law is not simply a moral 
and legal theory grounded in human nature, but one that is grounded in what we might 
call "cosmic nature."   
 From the perspective of ancient theorists, the suggestion that the Stoics inherited 
and preserved without significant revisions a single, unified, and generally coherent 
Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition is suspect.  The "Old Academy" thesis of 
Antiochus of Ascalon is perhaps the most well known and most important example of 
such a claim.
202
  He argued that Plato's Academy in its essence is not defined by endless 
inconclusive debate but by the advancement of certain ideas and positions by Plato's 
successors, including Aristotle and the Stoics.  Julia Annas summarizes Antiochus' view 
as follows: "All [the Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics] are really doing, he claims, is to 
introduce new technical terms; the basic underlying ideas are the same...On all important 
matters, Antiochus claims, [they] stand together.  They stand united against the 
Epicureans, who disagree with all of them on most major points."
203
   But Antiochus' 
claim existed on one extreme of ancient debate.
  
On the opposite extreme, the 
Pyrrhoneans rejected even a single Platonic school of thought and asserted instead that 
the original Academy held no dogmatic positions (either Platonic or Aristotelian) and 
thus every philosophical claim was open for discussion.  Moreover, the early Stoics under 
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the leadership and influence of Zeno of Citium and especially of Chrysippus advanced 
novel theses that were neither Platonic nor Aristotelian: they were metaphysical 
materialists, for example, and thus rejected the notion of "Forms."  They also developed a 
new system of logic that departed from traditional (largely Aristotelian) principles.  In the 
area of moral theory, the Stoics identified themselves as Platonic and perceived the 
Aristotelians as philosophic rivals.
204
  They defended the Platonic thesis (rejected by 
Aristotle) that virtue is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia.  This latter thesis implies 
that conventional goods are unnecessary for happiness and may not be called "goods" at 
all in the proper sense of the term.  Indeed, some scholars have considered this thesis and 
its rejection by Aristotle to represent the central debate upon which all of ancient moral 
theory turns.
205
   
 Moreover, the Stoics maintained certain controversial positions within the 
Platonic moral tradition - a tradition full of robust substantive philosophic disagreement.  
The Stoics Epictetus and especially Zeno defend the Socratic claim that only the soul is 
worth caring for, that the body and other externals, which fortune might alter one way or 
another, are of no proper concern for the true philosopher.
206
  Indeed Zeno's departure 
from the Academy resulted in part from unresolved disagreement with Polemo, his 
teacher and head of the Academy, concerning this claim.
207
   Moreover, the Stoics 
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defended the "intellectualist" thesis of Socrates found in the Meno: virtue is knowledge, 
and thus ethics amounts to the task of replacing false beliefs with true ones that are 
properly justified.  Accompanying this position is the assertion that one always does what 
one believes to be right or good.  Of course, not all ancient Platonists held this view, 
perhaps not even Plato himself.  We should not be surprised, therefore, that the Stoics 
sometimes identified themselves as "Socratics."
208
   But if "Socratic ethics" is to be 
understood as unsystematic and skeptical, then the Stoics represent a clear departure from 
such a perspective. The Stoics advocate a distinct system of moral thought that can be 
expressed propositionally, defended syllogistically, and taught to others - a claim that 
stands in direct opposition to Socrates' final assessment in the Meno.   
 The foregoing point is important because perhaps the central debate within the 
Academy, as I suggested previously, concerned the extent to which one is justified in 
believing that Plato provided a system of doctrines he meant to defend in his dialogues.  
This question became acute in 265 B.C. when Arcesilaus, the new head of the Academy, 
insisted that for too long the Academy had been seeking to develop metaphysical 
systems, ones that were only partially Platonic, and as a result they had forgotten the 
primary task of dialogue rather than positing positive doctrines.  The primary target of 
Arcesilaus' critique were the Stoics, well known by this point for emphasizing systematic 
thought.  But after many years of attempting to refute the Stoics, the Academic Skeptics, 
as they were known, apparently adopted an essentially Stoic framework of beliefs as the 
primary means by which to locate their own arguments against the Aristotelians and 
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Epicureans on a range of issues.
209
  This development provoked the aforementioned 
departures of Antiochus and Aenesidemus from the Skeptical Academy during the first 
century B.C.   
 The purpose of the foregoing historical summary is this:  Cicero's De Finibus 
(DF) and De Republica (DR),
 
 the works in which we are able to piece together a 
coherent account of NLT for the first time, were written against a background of 
development and discord both within and without the Academy, a background that 
Cicero takes seriously in his analysis of Epicurean, Aristotelian, and Stoic moral 
theories.
210
  Indeed, in DF Plato and Aristotle are conspicuously absent and Cicero 
provides at least a partial reason:  
 What of it, if I do not perform the task of a translator, but preserve the views of 
 those whom I consider sound while contributing my own judgment and order of 
 composition?...For my part, I consider that this work gives a more or less 
 comprehensive discussion of the question of the highest goods and evils.  In it I 
 have investigated not only the views with which I agree, but those of each of the 
 philosophical schools individually.
211
   
 
Cicero does not intend the work to simply summarize the teachings of Plato and Aristotle 
(it is not a "translation," as he puts it), but rather to present and critique the primary 
ethical theories in their most current form, taking into account the philosophical 
developments that have occurred in the few centuries since Plato and Aristotle.  One of 
the things that careful attention to these developments should make clear is that the 
attempt to combine Stoic and Aristotelian ethics, to take Antiochus' project as an 
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example, results in an interpretation that neglects central arguments made on both sides 
on such crucial issues as whether virtue is sufficient for happiness.
212
  One can maintain 
Antiochus' interpretation, Cicero argues, only as long as one is willing to abandon the 
systematic investigation of all claims by reason and argument (the Socratic elenchos that 
Cicero, as an Academic Skeptic, took very seriously) and prefer persuasive rhetoric 
instead.
213
    
 Among the most important and most obvious of the aforementioned developments 
reflected in Cicero's work, especially DF, is the prominent place of metaphysics in moral 
theory.  The debate over conventional goods remained central, at least between the Stoics 
and the Aristotelians, but it is obvious that by Cicero's time differing conceptions of 
physis in the rival schools had also become a major theme of moral debate.  In 
summarizing his preliminary objections to Epicurus' moral theory, for example, Cicero 
begins with a detailed attack on Epicurus' physics (specifically its atomist thesis) and then 
proceeds to a critique of his work in logic.
 214
  That Cicero takes for granted the central 
place of metaphysics in moral theory is not entirely surprising.  A dominant assumption 
in Hellenistic moral debate - one that began, as I will discuss shortly, with the Epicurean 
challenge to the eudaimonist tradition - is that getting theoretical matters right is essential 
to cultivating moral virtue.  It is this same assumption which underlies, for instance, the 
Epicurean argument that a proper understanding of physics is central to why one should 
                                                 
212
 See DF V.77-86. 
213
 I should note that Antiochus' position, at least as it is represented in Books IV and V of DF, is less an 
interpretive thesis and more a philosophic one.  That is, his main focus is to develop a theory that 
emphasizes the philosophical similarities and downplays the differences between Stoic and Aristotelian 
ethics.  Thus, Cicero may not intend to be as dismissive of his former teacher as I seem to suggest.  My 
point still stands, however: insofar as Antiochus' Old Academy position can be understood as an historical 
interpretation of Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian views, it is fraught with problems. 
214
 DF I.17-22. 
  96 
not fear death.
215
  For this reason DF moves almost seamlessly and unapologetically 
between epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical topics, often within the same passage.   
 As a further example, Zeno's break from the Academy resulted only in part from 
his rejection of Platonic metaphysics.  What may have been more important was his 
endorsement of a tightly integrated philosophical system of physics, ethics, and logic.  As 
Aetius summarized in his Preface, 
 The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the human, 
 and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility.  Virtue singly and at its 
 highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are triple - the physical one, 
 the ethical one, and the logical one.  For this reason philosophy also has three 
 parts - physics, ethics, and logic.
216
   
 
This tripartite curriculum aimed at "singular virtue" was elsewhere likened to an egg: 
"logic is the outside, ethics what comes next, and physics the innermost parts."
217
  While 
the Stoics may have borrowed the tripartite division of subjects from the post-Platonic 
Academy of Xenocrates, it is almost certain that they were among the first to conceive of 




 But the early Stoic writings make clear that the development of their 
philosophical curriculum occurred, not independently, but in polar opposition to the 
systematic thinking of the Epicureans.  While the Stoics would be the most adamant and 
outspoken advocates of philosophy as a system of integrated knowledge, the philosophers 
of "the Garden" were the first to perceive in the notion of systematic philosophy a direct 
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challenge to the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition of treating ethics, physics, and logic 
largely as separate disciplines.  I look at this claim more closely in the following section. 
 
4.2  Science and Pleasure: The Epicurean Challenge 
 The Epicureans seem to have been the first to advance a theory of human 
happiness in which scientific reasoning not only provides the foundation for a proper 
conception of practical rationality but is the defining characteristic of the practically wise 
individual.
219
  As we have seen, this position is absent in Plato and Aristotle.  Neither 
conceived of the natural philosopher as an individual of practical wisdom because of his 
scientific (or theoretical) insight.  I have argued against taking Plato's idea of 
philosopher-kings too seriously, that is, as a genuine thesis of political philosophy that 
Plato meant to defend.  There is no basis in Plato's writings for the claim that the 
knowledge of the enlightened philosopher includes or entails a knowledge of how to 
effectively manage his own practical affairs and that of others given the ever-changing 
realities of political life.   Aristotle is even more explicit: the knowledge of the ideal 
philosopher is "godlike but useless" for moral and political matters because it concerns 
eternal realities and pays no attention to human goods.
220
  It is not a knowledge of the 
cosmos, or even of human nature, that makes one good, but rather a proper upbringing in 
the virtues.
221
  Both assume that theoretic activity, the contemplation of the highest 
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realities, is itself a process of becoming like God (or the gods), and both assume that the 
divine life is entirely free of social and practical concerns (which is part of its 
perfection).
222
  For the Epicureans, however, human tranquility and well-being consists in 
the life of practical wisdom and virtue that is informed (and even defined) by scientific 
enlightenment.  As I will attempt to show, this new "unified conception," we may call it, 
entails a blurring of the distinction between theoretical and practical reason and is the 
root of the Epicurean challenge to the eudaimonism of Plato and Aristotle.
223
   
 The Epicurean emphasis on the practical value of natural philosophy was part and 
parcel of their defense of their chief ethical claim: intrinsic goodness (in contrast to 
instrumental goodness) is restricted to pleasure alone, which is to say that pleasure is the 
only good that is inherently worth seeking.
224
  This claim of course entails a rejection of 
traditional eudaimonism (in both its Platonic and Aristotelian forms) that identifies 
goodness with virtue and, thus, human happiness with virtuous activity.   But Epicurus' 
claim may not be as radical as it appears prima facie.  Both Plato and Aristotle held 
pleasure to be an important, even essential, constituent of happiness.  Moreover, in 
several places Epicurus' himself insists that the hedonism he advocates requires virtue: 
"Therefore prudence is even more precious than philosophy, and it is the natural source 
of all the remaining virtues: it teaches the impossibility of living pleasurably without 
living prudently, honorably, and justly...For the virtues are naturally linked with living 
                                                 
222
 Plato explicitly states this in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle accepts the claim, or at least some form of it, 
in NE X.7-8. 
223
 One may object that while Aristotle held this distinction, Plato did not.  But that point does not entail 
that Plato believed, as the Epicureans later did,  that theoretical reason just is practical reason, or at least is 
a fundamental component of it.  As I argue in Chapter 2, Plato simply did not give attention to what 
Aristotle would call practical thought or wisdom defined in contrast to theoretical wisdom.  If human 
nature lacks a social function, as Plato's anthropology seems to suggest, then he does not appear to have a 
philosophical reason for developing an account of practical rationality. 
224
 THP, 21C-E. 
  99 
pleasurably, and living pleasurably is inseparable from them."
225
  Making the same 
essential point, perhaps with the foregoing passage in mind, Cicero's Torquatus  states 
that "Epicurus, the man whom you accuse of being excessively devoted to pleasure, in 
fact proclaims that one cannot live pleasantly unless one lives wisely, honorably, and 
justly; and that one cannot live wisely, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly."
226
   
 The foregoing point is important for two reasons.  First, one cannot reject 
Epicurean hedonism simply on the grounds that it advocates a life of pleasure at the 
expense of virtue in both the theoretical and moral senses.  This would represent a weaker 
form of hedonism that Epicurus identifies primarily with Aristippus and the Cyrenaic 
school and could perhaps be linked to Callicles' position in the Gorgias.
227
  The second 
and more important point is that Epicurus' defense of the virtues makes clear the key 
distinction between his position and the traditional eudaimonism of Plato and Aristotle: 
while Plato and Aristotle regarded virtuous activity as good in the intrinsic (non-
instrumental) sense, the Epicurean position is that virtuous activity is good only insofar as 
it is conducive to living pleasurably (and hence good only in the instrumental sense).  
Neither moral nor theoretical virtue are identified with happiness, but are necessary 
means to it.  Torquatus is explicit on this point: "not even temperance itself is to be 
sought for its own sake, but rather because it brings our hearts peace and soothes and 
softens them with a kind of harmony...We seek these virtues because they enable us to 
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live without trouble or fear, and to free our mind and body as much as possible from 
distress."
228
   
 Torquatus' assessment contains an important suggestion regarding the value of 
natural philosophy in particular.  The main cause of human misery is philosophic (or 
scientific) ignorance, that is, an ignorance about the true nature of the world.  This 
ignorance means that in the place of correct beliefs about such things as gods and souls, 
human beings maintain false beliefs that cause the unnatural fear of death in addition to 
other miseries.  It is not on the basis of knowledge,  but unfounded belief or opinion that 
we think gods and the afterlife exist and thus live in the fear of those things.  Hence, 
"[Epicurus] deemed physics to be of the very highest importance...By knowing the nature 
of all things we are freed from superstition and liberated from the fear of death."
229
  The 
Epicurean position, then, may be best understood in light of Socrates' position that the 
good life largely rests upon our ability to acquire a certain kind of knowledge about what 
is good and what is bad and other related matters.  The Epicureans agree with the 
Socrates of the Meno that we cannot content ourselves with opinions, even if they happen 
to be true ones, but must seek a surer foundation in knowledge if we are to live well.
230
  
But unlike Socrates (and Aristotle later on), who apparently rejects the value of scientific 
knowledge for moral considerations, the Epicureans assert that it is only from a correct 
knowledge of nature that we can make correct moral judgments.
231
  Indeed, the study of 
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nature indicates beyond all doubt, the Epicureans argue, that our natural end and highest 
good is pleasure.   
 I should further develop the foregoing point, for the Epicurean "argument from 
the cradle"
232
 not only helps to clarify their position on pleasure as the highest good,
233
 
but it also represents a key development in their debate with the Stoics.  Cicero's 
Torquatus provides the clearest summary of the argument available: 
 Every animal as soon as it is born seeks pleasure and rejoices in it, while shunning 
 pain as the highest evil and avoiding it as much as possible.  This is behavior that 
 has not yet been corrupted, when nature's judgment is pure and whole.  Hence he 
 [Epicurus] denies that there is any need for justification or debate as to why 
 pleasure should be sought, and pain shunned.  He thinks that this truth is 
 perceived by the senses, as fire is perceived to be hot, snow white, and honey 
 sweet.  In none of these examples is there any call for proof by sophisticated 
 reasoning; it is enough simply to point them out.  He maintains that there is a 
 difference between reasoned argumentative proof and mere noticing or pointing 
 out; the former is for the discovery of abstruse and complex truths, the latter for 
 judging what is clear and straightforward.  Now since nothing remains if a person 
 is stripped of sense-perception, nature herself must judge what is in accordance 




The key point to notice is that the argument rests on a presupposed empirical theory of 
knowledge that, as Michael Frede points out, Epicurus advanced against a background of 
doubt regarding our ability "to break out of the realm of mere belief in order to arrive at 
true knowledge."
235
  Frede overlooks another key part of this background, namely, the 
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skepticism of certain fourth-century followers of the atomist philosopher Democritus who 
doubted the validity of sense perception in particular.
236
    The Epicurean response (which 
I can only briefly develop in what follows) was to develop an epistemology generally 
rooted in the assumption that nature conveys itself clearly and unmistakably to the human 
knower, at least in certain contexts.    
 At the center of Epicurus' empirical theory was the notion of "impressions"
237
 and 
the claim that all impressions are true, that is, their content accurately and directly 
conveys reality to the knower.
238
  The truth of this claim depends upon the premise that 
all impressions are arational events, involving no interpretation by the human mind and 
thus are received directly or non-inferentially.  Epicurus explains the premise thusly:  
 The peculiar function of sensation is to apprehend only that which is present to it 
 and moves it, such as color...Hence for this reason all impressions are true.  
 Opinions, on the other hand, are not all true but admit of some difference.  Some 
 of them are true, some false, since they are judgments which we make on the 





The basic idea seems to be that the human mind in this context is an entirely passive 
recipient of certain bite-sized pictures of reality, which can then be rendered by the 
human mind in the form of true propositions that are the foundation of all knowledge.  
The validity of impressions cannot be questioned or refuted, but rather are the standards 
by which all judgments are evaluated as being either true or false.   Thus, only judgments 
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that accord with our impressions, or are based on such judgments, can count as 
knowledge (epistēmē) rather than mere belief or opinion (doxa).240    
 To return to the argument from the cradle, Epicurus' main reason for holding that 
pleasure is the highest good is that young children and animals, because they have no 
beliefs - or, more properly, judgments - and thus could not act upon false beliefs, 
demonstrate irrefutable evidence for what our natural good is.  (We should be careful not 
to say "natural end" (telos), for part of  the argument here rejects the notion of some 
future, final, and optimal state of activity that has not yet been realized in the infant child 
or animal.)  It would be misleading to interpret Epicurus as saying the child knows that 
pleasure is the highest good and acts upon that judgment because knowledge consists in 
judgments in accordance with given impressions and the given child has not made any 
judgments.  Rather, the point is that any moral theory that derives its central claims from  
impressions does not need to provide further justification for those claims.  Thus, just as 
the child who seeks pleasure and avoids pain (an empirical fact that we are to presuppose 
as valid and incontrovertible) does not need further justification for his actions, neither 




 Thus, by way of an epistemology of empirical impressions the Epicureans assert 
the place and, in a certain sense, authority of nature in the realm of moral philosophy.  
Nature is not authoritative in the sense of making commands or laws that human beings 
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are obligated to obey — the strong sense of "ought" that underlies NLT — but rather it is 
authoritative in the realm of moral argument such that any premise directly or indirectly 
derived from an impression is valid on that basis alone.  Torquatus has this point in mind 
when he speaks of the authority of "nature's judgments."
242
  The apparent personification 
of nature is metaphorical: the Epicureans never attempt to apply their atomistic 
cosmology in the construction of a theory of obligation rooted in certain judgments or 
laws of nature.
243
  Moreover, one of the primary practical benefits of atomism, the 
Epicureans often insist, is the enjoyment of liberation from fear of a higher or 
transcendent authority, one that appears to be implied in the notion of natural law.
244
  The 
point, rather, is that impressions are the first (in the sense of primary or foundational) 
judgments, as it were, because they come directly from nature and hence there could be 
no more basic or authoritative judgments by which we can evaluate other claims.   
 While not a theory of natural law, Epicurean moral theory does represent a 
definite turn toward nature, particularly in the area of moral epistemology - a turn that, in 
my view, was essential for the subsequent birth of natural law in Stoic thought.  The 
Epicurean challenge to the received eudaimonist tradition, as I have argued, did not 
simply concern their rejection of teleology or their instrumental conception of virtue, but 
was rooted in the claim that the theoretical investigation of nature is not only part of 
moral reasoning but is the very foundation of it.  This is what I have called the unified 
conception of practical reason.  Torquatus summarizes the position as follows: 
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 So if the philosophy I have been describing is clearer and more brilliant than the 
 sun; if it is all drawn from the fount of nature; if my whole speech gains 
 credibility by being based on the uncorrupted and untainted testimony of the 
 senses; if inarticulate children and even dumb beasts can, under the guidance and 
 direction of nature, almost find the words to declare that there is nothing favorable 
 but pleasure, and nothing unfavorable but pain - their judgment about such 
 matters being neither perverted nor corrupted; if all this is so, then what a debt of 
 thanks we owe to the man who, as it were, heard nature's own voice and 
 comprehended it with such power and depth that he has managed to lead all those 




That Epicurus heard "nature's own voice" suggests that he held an essential claim of 
natural law, namely, that descriptive (or metaphysical) truths just are normative ones, and 
vice versa.  But to read Epicurean thought this way would be a mistake.  As we have 
seen, science affords the philosopher with truths - specifically, judgments in accordance 
with impressions - that are of instrumental value to practical reasoning but are not 
themselves normative truths or principles.  The enlightened philosopher uses his 
scientific knowledge in order to form sensible practical judgments that enable the 
enjoyment of a tranquil life; and because of his knowledge, the philosopher does not hold 
any false beliefs that would undermine his ability to make sound practical judgments.  In 
the remainder of this chapter, I attempt to conclude my main argument in this dissertation 
by arguing that the Stoic response to the Epicurean challenge centered on the collapse 
between metaphysical and normative truths - a collapse that was, I believe, essential to 
the formation of Stoic NLT.    
  
4.3  Katalēpsis and the Stoic Metaphysics of Knowing 
 The Stoics not only continued but greatly strengthened the Epicurean theme that 
the natural philosopher is the practically wise individual.  As R.J. Hankinson observes, 
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"Stoic Sages never make mistakes.  Secure in their understanding of the providential 
structure of the world...Sages order their lives in accordance with it, assimilating  their 
will to the will of Zeus, living in accordance with nature, and so achieving the smooth 
flow of life, the eurhoia biou so devoutly to be wished for."
246 
 The ideal of the Stoic 
Sage, as Hankinson puts it, may not be attainable.  Indeed, it seems at least some Stoics 
were doubtful whether anyone had ever achieved such an ideal.
247
  Nevertheless, at the 
center of Stoic moral theory is a robust confidence in the possibility of infallible and 
more or less comprehensive scientific knowledge that simultaneously conveys "what is" 
(huparchon) and what ought to be.    
 As with the Epicureans, the Stoics developed an epistemology that centered on 
the notion of impression (phantasia) and, more specifically, the idea that nature provides 
us with certain infallible impressions that accurately convey reality to the knower.  The 
Stoics, too, were under skeptical pressure, especially from the Academic Skeptics, to 
show how our beliefs about the world represent knowledge rather than mere opinions.  
However, while the Stoics maintained the reliability of impressions in general - that is, 
impressions received under normal circumstances - they reject Epicurus' thesis that all 
impressions are true.  Epicurus based this claim on the distinction between impressions 
and judgments: while the latter could be either true or false, the former can only be true.  
Impressions never fail in reporting atomic images of the object that causes the 
impression.  For the Stoics, however, some impressions can be false, e.g. that a pole 
bends when submerged in water.  As Carneades summarizes, "because [impressions] do 
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not always reveal what is truly there, but often deceive us and is at variance with the 
things which transmitted it, like incompetent messengers, a necessary consequence is  
that we cannot allow every impression to be a criterion of truth, but just, if any, the true 
impression."
248
 But, of course, this does not answer how can one tell the difference 
between a true and a false impression.  The answer, first offered by Zeno, comes in the 
notion of "cognitive impressions" (phantasia katalēptikē). 
 According to the Stoics, cognition (katalēpsis) represents a third state besides 
those of mere belief (doxa) and knowledge (epistēmē).  In this state, one holds a belief 
that is not mere opinion but neither is it knowledge.  Frede illustrates the basic idea of 
cognition in this way:  
 When I clearly see that the book in front of me is green, it is not a matter of mere 
 opinion if I think that the book is green.  Nor yet, however, is it a matter of 
 knowledge.  For to know that the book is green is supposed to be a matter of 
 being in a state such that there is no argument which could persuade one that it is 
 not the case that the book is green.  But the mere fact that one clearly sees that the 
 book is green does not suffice to rule out the possibility that one can be argued 
 into not believing that the book is green.
249
   
 
Cognition, then, involves assenting to certain impressions that we have good reason for 
believing to be true, which is to say that we take the impression to accurately convey 
some object that is the cause of the impression, and we have no obvious reason for 
believing otherwise (and hence it cannot be mere opinion); and, at the same time, we do 
not have sufficient reason for holding the belief against all arguments to the contrary (and 
hence it cannot count as knowledge on the Stoic view).  We should be careful here.  The 
Stoics hold that cognition is assent to a true impression, and thus it is not possible for the 
knower, when he cognizes something, to be deceived (even though he might be talked out 
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of his belief).  The reason for this has to do with the term katalēpsis itself, literally 
translated as "grasp."  Hence, a cognitive impression is an impression that makes itself 
available to be grasped by the human mind.  When the mind cognizes, that is, when it 
assents to a cognitive impression, it is in touch with real things and grasps them as such.   
 The foregoing point is worth emphasizing: by grasping cognitive impressions, the 
Stoics do not mean grasping images or pictures that represent certain objects.  Rather, 
impressions reveal, as does light, what is truly there.  Aetius writes, "The word 
'impression' (phantasia) is derived from 'light' (phōs); just as light reveals itself and 
whatever else it includes in its range, so impression reveals itself and its cause.  The 
cause of an impression is an impressor: e.g., something white or cold or everything 
capable of activating the soul."
250
  The analogy of light is also helpful for explaining that 
not all cognitive impressions are equally clear and distinct: "just as light can vary in its 
illuminating effects," Long and Sedley observe, "so sense-impressions can vary in the 
clarity and distinctness with which they represent their objective causes."
251
  This raises a 
key issue in Stoic epistemology, namely, the extent to which clarity and distinctness can 
be relied upon as a standard for determining the strength of one's assent to an impression 
- an issue that is beyond my interest in this chapter.   
 For the present purpose, it is enough to emphasize the following key point: a 
cognitive impression is an event in which the rational human mind naturally grasps some 
part of the rational natural order, a natural order that reveals itself to the knower as a clear 
and distinct impression that could only arise from "what is" (huparchon).
252
  Thus, the 
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Stoics were in the habit of referring to cognitive impressions as "nature's gift" for 
discerning true beliefs from false ones: "For nature has given the sensory faculty and the 
impression which arises thereby as our light, as it were, for the recognition of  truth."
253
  
The Stoics take for granted that under normal conditions human beings, as rational 
creatures, are not only able to make correct judgments that form the basis of knowledge, 
but are also naturally inclined, even determined, to assent to such impressions.  The Stoic 
notion of "common conceptions" and "preconceptions" takes this point one step further.  
Apparently it was Chrysippus who advanced the position that nature reveals itself, not 
only by cognitive impressions, but also by certain common conceptions and 
preconceptions which serve as standards for validating beliefs about things that simple 
cognitive impressions do not reveal.  It is unclear what Chrysippus means to include 
under common conceptions and preconceptions, but evidence suggests belief in God and 
providence and certain universal truths.
254
  These beliefs do not exist as innate ideas, 
however, because sense-perception remains the fountain of all our impressions.
255
  
Rather, "it is by  reason," Diogenes Laertius says, "that we get cognition of conclusions 
reached through demonstration, such as the gods' existence and their providence."
256
   
 Notwithstanding certain problems with common conceptions and preconceptions 
(and there are some problems),
257
  the thesis further illustrates the critical point to notice 
about Stoic epistemology: what underlies this particular theory of knowledge is a 
confidence in the fundamental sensibility of the world, that it is rationally ordered and 
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fully accessible to the human mind.  It is a confidence in the possibility of a genuine 
knowledge of nature for all rational creatures, and it is a confidence that is rooted, I 
believe, in a new conception of nature, and, along with it, a new conception of human 
nature.  Plato and Aristotle reject this confidence outright.  Only the fortunate few, those 
who are endowed with "gold souls," as Plato puts it, those who are free, wealthy, and are 
not natural slaves, have the potential to acquire the enlightenment that comes by 
sustained theōria.258  The skeptics rejected the suggestion that anyone could achieve such 
knowledge - or at least that anyone had achieved it in the past.  The Epicureans were the 
first to advance a theory of knowledge that sought to address the challenges of the 
skeptics, but they make no point one way or another on the possibility of widespread 
scientific knowledge.  The main reason for this is clear:  the Stoics, unlike the Epicureans 
(as well as Plato and Aristotle), presuppose that nature and human beings are so 
constituted as to make knowledge of the former an entirely natural thing for the latter to 
achieve.
259
  The point is stronger, in fact: nature has providentially endowed human 
beings not only with the necessary mental equipment for making accurate judgments, an 
activity that is a constituent part of the life of "following nature," but also with the natural 
inclination to assent to the kinds of impressions, specifically cognitive impressions, that 
accurately convey reality to the knower.
260
  The foregoing analysis of Stoic epistemology 
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was necessary to make this point clear.  It should be unsurprising, then, that on a Stoic set 
of assumptions the suggestion that nature also supplies the human mind with certain 
preconceptions and common notions that makes possible the knowledge of realities that 
are not directly conveyed by means of sense-perception is an entirely plausible thesis.  
We might summarize the main point thusly: to a person who finds Stoic epistemology 
doubtful and unconvincing, the Stoic philosopher would respond by pointing out that 
such a person in all likelihood maintains a false or misguided conception of the natural 
order and, indeed, of himself.     
 
4.4  Homologia, Oikeiōsis, and Natural Law 
 The foregoing point is meant  to suggest the central Stoic notion of homologia - 
usually rendered as "living in conformity with nature," though its importance in Stoic 
moral theory is far more complicated than this phrase suggests.  As we have seen, a 
strong case could be made that the Epicureans also understood human happiness to be a 
matter of following nature.  But with the term homologia, the Stoics obviously do not 
have the Epicurean model in mind.  Michael J. White summarizes homologia in the 
following way: "Homologia is an identification of oneself with the divine reason that 
pervades and orders the cosmos; it is a matter of 'using one's  reason for the purposes for 
which it is designed, that is, for reaching truth about the world.  Knowledge of this truth 
includes knowledge of "what particular things in it are valuable for oneself.  That is what 
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'preserves' one's new, rational 'constitution.'"
261
  In this summary it is striking and of 
fundamental importance that homologia involves both self-identification (a matter of 
properly understanding one's own nature) as well as proper activity (using reason to 
achieve what we have been calling scientific knowledge, or "knowledge about the 
world").  Homologia, in other words, contains both descriptive and prescriptive senses.  It 
is a term that captures not only a basic truth about human nature, but also a basic 
normative truth about how human beings ought to live.   
 Homologia in its descriptive sense, that is, an understanding or "identification" of 
oneself with nature understood as Divine Reason, connotes the notion of belonging, as in 
one thing belonging to another.
262
  Self-identification is a rendering of the term oikeiōsis, 
which literally translates as "appropriation" because of the connotations of property 
ownership that the Greek root oik- contains.  In this sense of the term, Annas' translation 
of oikeiōsis as "familiarization" makes sense.  "The idea is that of finding something 
congenial and regarding it as one's own."
263
  We must be careful, however, because the 
sense in which human beings are appropriated to Divine Reason is neither an arbitrary 
action nor a forced one.
264
  Rather, part of what the term is meant to convey is the need 
for a transformation of our ordinary conception of ourselves into an enlightened self-
understanding that identifies oneself with the divine rational order and redefines our 
entire view of the appropriate human end (telos).  The difference between this view and 
the Platonic and Aristotelian one is obvious and important: while Plato and Aristotle both 
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affirm the ultimate ideal of human beings transcending human nature and becoming 
divine, which only a few can achieve, the Stoics emphasize the full realization of what 
we already are as members of the divine natural order.
265
   
 But as Cicero makes clear in DF III.16, oikeiōsis for the Stoics does not simply 
mean a theoretical apprehension of our true human nature (something that does not come 
until later in life, when our conceptions of ourselves and of nature have matured), but the 
term also conveys certain natural inclinations toward the human telos that are present 
from birth and evolve as one grows into adulthood.  These inclinations are both 
compelling motivations to act in certain ways and discrete stages of self-awareness.  As 
with the Epicureans, the Stoics look to develop an argument from the cradle which 
Cicero presents in the following way: 
 Every animal, as soon as it is born (this is where one should start), is concerned 
 with itself, and takes care to preserve itself.  It favors its constitution and whatever 
 preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever 
 appears to promote its destruction.  In support of this thesis, the Stoics point out 
 that babies seek what is good  for them and avoid the opposite before they ever 
 feel pleasure or pain.  This would not happen unless they valued their own 
 constitution and feared destruction.  But neither could it happen that they would 
 seek anything at all unless they had self-awareness and thereby self-love.  So one 




The first inclination of human nature is not pleasure, as the Epicureans had supposed, but 
rather "self-love."  Cicero has already provided a devastating critique of the Epicurean 
argument on behalf of static pleasure - roughly, the notion of pleasure as the complete 
absence of pain, which is the highest and most natural good for a human being to seek.
267
  
In DF II.31-32, he points out that it is hardly evident that "the bawling infant" seeks static 
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rather than kinetic pleasure.
268
  He adds to this a key point: static pleasure "is not the sort 
of thing that can arouse appetitive desire.  The static condition of freedom from pain 
produces no motive force to impel the mind to act."
269
  Cicero's assumption is that only a 
positive desire can motivate an action; and, for Cicero, these desires come in the form of 
natural inclinations that are teleological by nature.  Hence we find in the Stoic argument 
from the cradle an account of "self-love," or a natural desire to preserve oneself, as the 
first natural inclination contained in oikeiōsis. 
 On the Stoic view, self-love is not selfishness or some like vice, but rather is the 
natural desire "to preserve one's constitution."  But this also needs clarification because 
the notion conveys something more than a mere natural instinct  to survive.  Self-love is 
rooted in the Stoic assumption that one naturally seeks one's own good (and conversely 
one naturally avoids that which is destructive to one's own good) and that self-love is 
only the first inclination among others that will together form the natural impulses aimed 
at an optimal human life.  Thus, self-love is a basic and compelling teleological 
inclination, one that involves a very rudimentary sense of self, some beginning idea of 
what we are that will mature with the addition of other natural inclinations that are aimed 
at higher ends than that of the first inclination of self-preservation which we share with 
the animals and all other living things.  Cicero explains the point as follows:  
                                                 
268
 Kinetic pleasure results from the satisfaction of the appetites.  But as Cicero will point out, the 
enjoyment of static pleasure seems to depend, at least at times, on satisfying those very appetitive desires 
that constitute kinetic pleasure, e.g. the absence of hunger results from the eating of food.  This is one of 
Cicero's stock examples that he uses to expose "the nest of fallacies" contained in the Epicurean position.  
His main point is that the distinction between static and kinetic pleasure has mere rhetorical value, and as 
such it cannot withstand serious philosophical examination (and, as Cicero seems to suggest, was never 
meant to because its aim was only to persuade).  This is evidence, for example, in the obvious fact that the 
opposite of pain is not pleasure but rather non-pain.  See DF II.28-32. 
269
 Ibid. 
  115 
 A human being's earliest concern is for what is in accordance with nature.  But as 
 soon as one has gained some understanding, or rather 'conception' (what the 
 Stoics call ennoia), and sees an order and as it were concordance in the things 
 which one ought to do, one then values that concordance much more highly than 
 those first objects of affection.  Hence through learning and  reason one concludes 
 that this is the place to find the supreme human good, that good which is to be 





There is, then, at least in the ideal case, a dynamic interrelation between the natural 
development of a human person in the form of inclinations and an ever enriching 
conception of ourselves and our primary end.  We gradually understand ourselves as 
creatures that are united with the entire realm of living things, and thus share basic 
principles in common with all members of that realm; and, at the same time, as creatures 
that are uniquely endowed by nature with the faculty of reason and thus have as our 
highest aim a life "in accordance with reason" (homologia) which, as Diogenes Laertius 
summarizes, "comes to be natural for [all rational beings]."
271
  Hence the Stoic 
conception of oikeiōsis as natural inclinations, as Cicero summarizes, is that which 
constitutes "nature's very own voice."
272
   
 The similarity of the Stoic view with Aristotle's analysis of the vegetative, 
appetitive, and rational elements of the human soul is hard to miss.
273
  Aristotle also 
understands these elements in terms of natural inclinations toward certain ends that 
represent the human good.  Unique to the Stoic understanding, however, is their emphasis 
on the superintending or providential role of nature in their conception of inclinations.  
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Diogenes Laertius adds the following to his summary of the Stoic argument from the 
cradle:  
 Therefore Zeno in his book On the nature of man was the first to say that living in 
 agreement with nature is the end, which is living in accordance with virtue.  For 
 nature  leads us toward virtue...Further, living in accordance with virtue is 
 equivalent to living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature, as 
 Chrysippus says in On ends book I: for our own natures are parts of the nature of 
 the whole.  Therefore, living in agreement with nature comes to be the end, which 
 is in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of  the whole, engaging in no 
 activity wont to be forbidden by the universal law, which is right reason 
 pervading everything and identical to Zeus, who is this director of the 




Implicit in this analysis - an analysis that is critical for the development of NLT, as I will 
discuss shortly - and absent from Aristotle's anthropology is a "theological conception" of 
nature, that is, nature as God or Divine Reason who is intentionally and comprehensively 
involved in the governance of the cosmos, a cosmos that somehow is identified with 
Divine Reason and simultaneously is governed by it.  Divine Reason is not simply the 
First Mover or the Prime Cause, but is intimately, universally, and perpetually ordering 
the whole of reality - a suggestion summarized by the Stoic term providence, rooted in 
the Greek term pronoia.  Textual evidence for this position is ubiquitous.  Cicero writes, 
for instance, that "it is by the providence of God [or the gods] that the world and all its 
parts were first compounded and have been governed for all time."
275
  Elsewhere he 
reports Chrysippus as saying that  
 divine power resides in reason and in the mind and intellect of universal nature.  
 He says that god is the world itself, and the universal pervasiveness of its mind; 
 also that he is the world's own commanding-faculty, since he is located in intellect 
 and reason; that he is the common nature of things, universal and all-embracing; 
 also the force of fate and the necessity of future events.  In addition he is fire; and 
 the aether of which I spoke earlier; also things in a natural state of flux and 
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 mobility, like water, earth, air, sun, moon, and stars; and the all-embracing whole; 




That such a conception is incompatible with Aristotle I take to be obvious: Aristotle's 
gods are perfect contemplators of eternal things, are entirely inattentive to the world of 
growth and decay, and thus could hardly be identified with the very things that constitute 
that ever-changing world.
277
   
 Divine providence, as Diogenes noted above, is central in explaining the path to 
virtue for human beings in particular.  Whereas Aristotle places much greater emphasis 
on proper parenting in the formation of good habits in the young - a point that the Stoics 
do not neglect - the Stoics place priority on the role of Divine Reason in equipping 
human beings and governing them with a view to virtuous activity.  Divine Reason has 
acted in such a way as to enable and encourage virtue in human life, and it is in 
connection with this point that the Stoics rely upon the concept of law in order to account 
for the teleological governance of nature, not only in human life but in all things.  It is by 
law that Divine Reason governs over all things, equipping everything to act in certain 
ways that accord with their specific nature; and, thus, the knowledge of the nature of 
things  is precisely a knowledge of that law, which we can at this point refer to as "natural 
law."  It is by providence working though law that all things act according to their 
natures, and that they do so invariably.   
 Diogenes' analysis adds a critical point: part of what the notion of law is supposed 
to convey, particularly in reference to human beings, is that we are bound and obligated 
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to actions in conformity with the natural law, "engaging in no activity wont to be 
forbidden by the universal law."
278
  What this implies is that the Stoics employ law, not 
merely to describe the unvarying natural activity of things which is known by the natural 
philosopher, but also as a prescriptive term connoting moral obligation.  Part of 
Diogenes' point, in other words, is that we are not only naturally inclined to act in 
accordance with nature or reason, we ought to act in such a way, with "ought" understood 
in the strong (non-conditional) sense.  It is obvious that part of the purpose of accounting 
for their moral theory in terms of law is to make the point that there exists an order of 
obligation, which is itself a system of law that has been authored by a divine lawgiver, 




 But if this interpretation is correct, then scientific truths are at once descriptive 
and prescriptive, and natural law as it is first used here by the Stoics must therefore 
represent the complete collapse of the distinction between descriptive and normative 
claims.  One obvious criticism of my interpretation, however, is that Diogenes' account 
seems to imply that human beings are capable of not acting in accordance with natural 
law, and thus it is not clear how such a law could be descriptive.  In other words, each 
time a person acts contrary to the natural law, then the particular natural law that would 
apply in that case fails as a descriptive account not only of  that person but of human 
beings universally.  This objection, however, only reveals a central problem that ancient 
and especially medieval natural law  theorists sought to address.  It would be superfluous 
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(and far too ambitious) for me to offer an account or even a summary of those attempts 
here.  It is an objection raised, not against my interpretation of NLT, but rather against 
the theory itself.  As for whether the Stoics themselves deny that natural laws are 
descriptive, there is no basis in their writings for such an interpretation, nor is there in the 
writings of later theorists (including Aquinas).  In the foregoing passage, for example, 
Diogenes stresses that "living in accordance with virtue is equivalent to living in 
accordance with experience of what happens by nature."  It does not appear that practical 
aberrations of the natural law do anything, on Diogenes' view, to change the fact that 
human beings are what they are, and that we are able to recognize those latent tendencies 
in human nature that constitute a descriptive account of it.   
 
4.5  Conclusion: The Core Claims of NLT 
 In his book Natural Law Modernized, David Braybrooke attempts to distill the 
essence of NLT into three "core claims": "first, there is a set of universally applicable 
moral rules, with principled allowances for variations in circumstances; second, (another 
empirical thesis), people will thrive and their societies will thrive only if these rules 
prevail; and third (a further empirical thesis), human beings by and large are inclined to 
heed these rules."
280
  I believe a careful analysis of the original formation of NLT, as I 
have attempted to provide (if only very briefly) in this dissertation, shows Braybrooke's 
summarization to be inadequate.
281
  By implication, the position of NNL, which also 
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rejects the essential place of metaphysics in NLT, is also inadequate.  In this final section, 
I will make a similar attempt to suggest a set of core claims of NLT based on the 
foregoing account.  As with Braybrooke, I understand these claims to provide the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for NLT, and thus they must be taken together.  A 
rejection of any one of these claims entails a rejection of NLT. 
 The core claims that I will suggest can be taken from a key passage in Cicero that 
scholars often regard as the classic statement of NLT:
282
 
 [L]aw in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature.  It is spread 
 through the whole human community, unchanging and eternal, calling people to 
 their duty by its commands and deterring them from wrong-doing by its 
 prohibitions.  When it addresses a good man, its commands and prohibitions are 
 never in vain; but those same commands and prohibitions have no effect on the 
 wicked.  This law cannot be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, 
 nor can it be totally rescinded.  We cannot be exempted from this law by any 
 decree of the Senate or the people; nor do we need anyone else to expound or 
 explain it.  There will not be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, one 
 now and another in the future, but all peoples at all times will be embraced by a 
 single and eternal and unchangeable law; and there will be, as it were, one lord 
 and master of us all - the god who is the author, proposer, and interpreter of that 
 law.  Whoever refuses to obey it will be turning back on himself.  Because he has 
 denied his nature as a human being he will face the gravest penalties for this 





The primary purpose of this dissertation has been to provide some account of the critical 
context for understanding  this passage, in particular the basic claims that form the 
essence of NLT.  First, there is an order of obligation, understood as a system or body of 
law, that exists prior to and is distinct from all human (positive) law.  Second, the content 
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of this law is supplied by truths of nature, that is, metaphysical or scientific truths, that 
are expressed in statements that are simultaneously descriptive and normative and are 
generally knowable to human beings.  And, third, there is a divine author of this law, one 
that is capable of providential governance of the cosmos by way of such laws that are 
both knowable to human beings and binding upon human actions and laws.   
 By "order of obligation," as I state in the first claim, I am suggesting an 
understanding of the moral "ought" in the strong imperative (non-conditional) sense.  
While the natural law does provide the conditions for human flourishing, and hence NLT 
is a eudaimonistic moral theory, the reason for obedience to its requirements is not 
strictly limited to the desire of moral agents to achieve their own well-being.  In other 
words, there is no basis for reading Cicero as accepting the following claim: One ought to 
obey the natural law if and only if one desires to live well or desires the same for others.  
Rather, Cicero emphasizes the binding and obligatory sense of the natural law by relying 
upon standard jurisprudential terminology (i.e. law, command, and prohibition) that 
imply moral obligation in a way that does not depend upon the satisfaction of certain 
prior conditions, including the condition that one already desires to fulfill such 
obligations.  The fact that Stoic NLT emphasizes the natural inclination of human beings 
to heed the natural law (oikeiōsis) does not entail that the obligation is in any way 
removed or diminished in the case that one does not desire to meet the obligation.  Indeed 
the Stoics were quite aware that many people simply reject the requirements of the 
natural law, and apparently embrace a life that any good Stoic would regard as living 
contrary to nature.  Such persons are not simply unhappy but, as Cicero says, "wicked."   
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 This last point is worth further investigation because it follows upon a key point 
that Cicero makes just prior to his use of the term wicked: "[The natural law] is spread 
through the whole human community, unchanging and eternal, calling people to their 
duty by its commands and deterring them from wrong doing by it s prohibitions.  When it 
addresses a good man, its commands and prohibitions are never in vain; but those same 
commands and prohibitions have no effect on the wicked."  The significance of the 
passage turns in large part on the phrase "calling people" because it sheds light on what 
Cicero means by the natural law being "spread through the whole human community."  
By "calling people," I believe Cicero has in mind the notion of oikeiōsis, and thus the 
passage should be read thusly: The natural law is spread through the whole human 
community...by way of the natural inclinations of human nature that predispose people to 
obey its commands.
284
  This reading is correct, I argue, because the following sentence is 
now sensible: a person is "good" because he acts in conformity with oikeiōsis, whereas 
for the "wicked" person these very same inclinations are never realized in his life in the 
form of virtuous activity, which is to say that he never acts upon them.  If this 
interpretation is correct, then oikeiōsis seems to contain what nature (Divine Reason) 
intends for human life - the imprint of its plan for human life in its ideal course, and 
hence the expression of the divine will, as it were.  Any action contrary to oikeiosis, then, 
is an action contrary to the rational divine will and is thus properly called wicked.   
 The idea of law as a type of plan or pattern is make explicit in Augustine and 
especially in Aquinas.  The latter writes,  
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 Just as in every craftsman there pre-exists a rational pattern (ratio) of the things 
 which are to be made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist a 
 rational pattern of the order of the things which are to be done by those subject to 
 his government.  And just as the rational pattern of the things to be made by an art 
 is called the art, or the exemplar of the products of that art, so too the rational 
 pattern existing in him who governs the acts  of his subjects bears the character of 
 law...Now God is the Creator of all things by His wisdom, and He stands in the 
 same relation to them as a craftsman does to the products of his art.  But He is 
 also the governor of all the acts and motions that are to be found in each single 
 creature.  Hence just as the rational pattern of the Divine wisdom has the   
 character of art or exemplar or idea in relation to all the things which are created 
 by it, so also the rational pattern of the Divine wisdom bears the character of law 
 in relation to all the things which are moved by it to their proper end.  
 Accordingly, the eternal law is nothing but the rational pattern of the Divine 




Thomas' argument and its compatibility with the Stoic conception of natural law is clear: 
the natural teleological tendencies of human nature towards some end are not self-moving 
and thus require a first mover who is both the author and  the director of human activity 
towards that same end; and this first mover is God or Divine Reason.  The point 
obviously suggests the second and third core claims.  For Thomas' position to be correct, 
then the natural tendencies or inclinations of human nature must be at once descriptive 
and normative, that is, they are facts about human beings, but they are not just facts but 
are, at the same time, concrete manifestations of law and what that law enjoins us to do.   
But this account of human nature obviously presupposes a divine being as the cause of 
such inclinations.  Hence the ends to which human beings are inclined are divinely 
established ends and cannot be understood properly apart from that presupposition.  As 
Thomas states, "it is clear that all things participate to some degree in the eternal law: that 
is, in so far as they derive from its being imprinted upon them their inclination to the 
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activities proper to them."
286
  He then adds a critical point about "rational creatures": "the 
rational creature is subject to Divine providence in a more excellent way...it participates 
in the eternal reason, by virtue of which it has a natural inclination to the activity and end 
proper to it; and such participation of the rational creature in the eternal law is called the 
natural law."
287
   
 The important point to notice from St. Thomas, then, concerns the necessity of the 
concept of divine providence for understanding natural inclinations within the framework 
of NLT.  Specifically, one cannot properly understand the place of natural inclinations in 
NLT, and the moral obligations that concern the fulfillment or realization of those natural 
inclinations, apart from a prior Divine Governor who, by way of providence, "imprints" 
upon human nature those very same inclinations.  One might discern these inclinations by 
way of strict empirical observation, leaving aside all metaphysical notions or 
presuppositions, but one cannot on that basis alone assert either their teleological 
character or their binding or obligatory force on human action.
288
  St. Thomas is not 
advancing a novel thesis in NLT, but rather fully accepts and further develops Cicero's 
statement that "there will be, as it were, one lord as master of us all - the god who is the 
author, proposer, and interpreter of that [eternal and unchangeable] law."  Natural law 
could not be understood as a theory of obligation apart from a theological conception of 
                                                 
286




 That this point is true is, as H.L.A. Hart has observed, all but universally acknowledged among modern 
scholars.    See The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 191-94. 
  125 
nature, that is, nature in all of its operations is the direct result of the providential 
workings of a divine being.
289
 
 As Augustine and Thomas evidence, the theological presupposition of NLT does 
not commit the theory to a tight conception of the divine, one that is identified with the 
natural order as in Stoic  theology.  Rather, the central concept is that of comprehensive 
providence (pronoia), the divine being governing over, in, and though the entire cosmos, 
from the greatest part of it to the least, to achieve a certain end or set of ends established 
by the divine being itself.  In Thomas' account of law in I.II.91, for example, he states 
that "on the supposition that the world is ruled by Divine providence...it is clear that the 
whole community of the universe is governed by Divine reason.  And so the rational 
pattern of the government of things which is in God as Ruler of the universe, itself has 
the character of law."
290
  It is noteworthy that Thomas' terminology is plainly Stoic, 
though he by no means endorses all aspects of Stoic theology.  But the critical aspect of it 
that he can accept and assimilate into a fully developed Christian theology is that of 
providence - a notion that is absent, of course, in Plato and Aristotle.  Among the early 
Stoics, Chrysippus is foremost in asserting the centrality of the doctrine of divine 
providence in his philosophical defense of Stoicism.
291
  We can explain our tendency 
toward community, toward the benefitting of as many people as possible, and all other 
                                                 
289
 One reasonable objection to my claim that providence is essential to Stoic NLT is that Plato also held to 
a providential theology centered on the Demiurge of the Timaeus.  A separate work is needed to treat this 
objection adequately.  Briefly, I believe that the Stoic conception of Divine Reason is fundamentally 
different from that of Plato's Demiurge regarding the concept of providence.  Neither is the Demiurge 
identified with the natural order, nor is it conceived of as perpetually involved in the governance of the 
cosmos.  Rather, the Demiurge is the grand craftsman who endowed the created world with its teleological 
order.   
290
 Emphasis added. 
291
See THP 55O-U.  Other Stoics, e.g. Cleanthes, sought to defend Stoic teachings on more religious 
grounds.  See his Hymn to Zeus in THP 54I. 
  126 
tendencies toward being full members of the cosmopolis by no other means than that of 
divine providence.
292
   
 Thus, the third core claim of NLT represents a general acceptance of G.E.M. 
Anscombe's intuition that the notion of "ought" in the strong imperative sense rests on the 
notion of law, and the notion of law rests upon the more fundamental notion of a divine 
lawgiver.  The suggestion that "law presupposes lawgiver" has, of course, been 
understood in a variety of ways and need not presuppose some form of voluntarism.  If 
the suggestion is to be rejected in principle, however, then it follows, according to my 
interpretation of NLT, that the notion of moral obligation must be jettisoned as well.  
Braybrooke's analysis of NLT is a case in point.  In his argument that the "core [natural 
law] theory does not invoke the will of God to establish the content of the moral rules," 
Braybrooke neglects the critical importance of obligation in his account of NLT, 
suggested in part by his preference for the term "rules" to the term "laws."  The closest he 
comes to directly addressing the question of obligation is in his assertion that Hobbes and 
Rousseau (whom he considers natural law theorists) both show how we might dispense 
with God and rest the imperative force of natural law on the authority of the state - the 
Sovereign for Hobbes, the General Will for Rousseau.  But this would entail that the 
imperative force of natural law rests upon positive law alone, an obviously problematic 
result because it implies that the natural law is not binding on anyone unless (or until) 
required by one's civil authority .  I am not aware of any pre-modern (classical) natural 
law theorist, including the Stoics, Augustine, and Aquinas, who would accept this claim.  
Cicero makes the compelling point here: "This law cannot be countermanded, nor can it 
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be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded.  We cannot be exempted from 
this law by any decree of the Senate or the people; nor do we need anyone else to 
expound or explain it."  Cicero's point, at least in part, is that the authority of the natural 
law does not in any way depend upon civil action.  This is because a human being, by 
virtue of his rational faculty, is first and foremost a citizen of the cosmopolis, a grand 
community constituted by law and governed by Divine Reason.  Thus, the natural law is 
not potential law awaiting enactment by the state.  The natural law is real law, 
perpetually in effect and perpetually binding, and is such because of the perpetual 
governance of Divine Reason, without whom there can be no natural law and thus no 
moral obligation as such.      
 If my account of NLT according to the three core claims is correct, then it should 
be clear why NNL is also inadequate insofar as it attempts consistency with the classical 
conception.  As with Braybrooke, though perhaps for different reasons, NNL attempts to 
free the theory from any firm metaphysical commitments (as discussed in Chapter 1).  
The effort is understandable.  By the start of the twentieth-century, if not earlier, the 
almost universal consensus among philosophers was (and continues to be) that 
metaphysics represents a most unpromising field of study and, thus, any moral theory that 
stands a chance of general acceptance must separate itself from the tangle of questions of 
nature.  Insofar as NNL theory can be understood as the attempt to salvage and renovate 
the older conception of natural law in order to meet modern objections, the interpretation 
is accurate and fair.  However, leading NNL theorists, beginning with Germain Grisez, 
have made a stronger claim, namely, that their conception of NLT is in essence that of the 
classical conception.   
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 According to the interpretation of NLT that I have presented and defended, this 
central assertion of NNL is incorrect.  The birth of natural law, as we have seen, came by 
way of a complete collapse between descriptive and normative claims.  Of course, the 
functionalistic conceptions of human flourishing provided by Plato and especially 
Aristotle implied that there was never a complete separation of "is" and "ought" claims.  
However, while Aristotle has no qualms with inferring value claims from fact claims, he 
does not assert, as Stoic NLT will later on, that fact claims just are value claims.  For 
Plato and Aristotle, the study of nature does not yield normative truth.  Aristotle 
explicitly asserts that we do not study the heavens in order to become better people.  The 
demotion of scientific inquiry to an instrumental virtue by the Epicureans, however, 
brought the study of nature more to the fore of moral theory.  The natural philosopher, 
rather than the practically inept individual of Plato and Aristotle, becomes the exemplar 
of practical wisdom in Epicureanism.  But the atomistic conception of the cosmos does 
not offer the Epicurean philosopher specifically moral knowledge, but rather scientific 
insight that is relevant for making practical decisions (e.g. if I understand that gods and 
an afterlife do not exist, then I will not live in fear or anticipation of such things).   
 In Stoic thought, rather, we find a conception of nature, one I have called 
"theological," that makes possible the use of "natural law" as a term that represents a 
coherent moral theory.  Prior to the Stoic development of the theological conception of 
nature, centered on the providential governance of Divine Reason, the juxtaposition of 
nomos and physis usually represented a contradiction in terms.  If the original 
development of NLT rested upon the claim that an understanding of the natural law is 
precisely an understanding of the truths of the natural order, as the Stoics insisted (and 
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Augustine and Aquinas with them), then a defense of NLT in our own time will mean, at 
least in large part, a defense of the value and the possibility of knowledge of the nature of 
things.  
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